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______________________________________________________________________
This thesis focuses on the issues between a blockchain technology and the new European Union
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Blockchain technology is a rather new
technology which potential has been recognised only in the recent years. Essentially, a
blockchain is a distributed database in which data is stored in blocks, which form a
chronological chain of blocks. Blockchains have many types and possible use cases, but this
research focuses on public and permissionless blockchains, which primary objective is to enable
individuals to transact with each other without centralised intermediaries.
The GDPR entered into force on 25 May 2018. The GDPR was not drafted taking account of
distributed ledger technologies, such as the blockchain technology, which has raised several
points of tension between the regulation and the technology. The primary focus of this thesis is
on the conflict between the ‘immutability’ of blockchain technology and the right to erasure
under Article 17 of the GDPR. One of the main features of blockchains is the immutability, that
is to say, data on old blocks is extremely difficult to modify or delete. This feature seems prima
facie to conflict with Article 17 of the GDPR that provides data subjects with the right to request
erasure of their personal data under certain conditions.
Firstly, this thesis analyses the current state of the conflict. Before analysing the conflict, the
research addresses two essential preliminary questions: the question about anonymisation and
personal data and the question about allocation of responsibilities on blockchains. After that,
different solutions proposed to reconcile the conflict are analysed to understand the current
situation. While public and permissionless blockchains currently may infringe Article 17 of the
GDPR, there are potential solutions for the conflict in the future.
The second purpose of this thesis is to identify relevant legal problems and propose how to
address the problems in the future. Blockchain developers should consider data protection
obligations already in the design phase. From the legal side, this research has provided flexible
interpretations for the legal problems that could help to comply with the right to erasure. There
is a need for a flexible approach to the problems between the regulation and the technology.
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Data protection and privacy are currently hot topics as the European Union General Data
Protection Regulation1 (GDPR) entered into force 25 May 2018. The GDPR and frequent
announcements of data breaches have attracted a lot of attention in the media that has increased
individuals’ awareness of their rights as data subjects. This is a welcomed trend in the digital
world, where personal data has been described as the ‘new oil of the internet’ or the ‘new
currency’. A vast amount of personal data is collected, processed, and analysed for different
purposes by private companies, governments, researchers, and so forth. The internet has turned
into a place where power and control are in the hands of big centralised intermediaries, such as
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, instead of individuals.2 Primarily the centralised
intermediaries collect and process personal data for appropriate purposes in order to offer better
user-centric products and services and to foster innovation. Despite the positive purposes,
several points of tension have been recognised in respect to privacy and data protection of
individuals.
The Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal was an illustrative example of the risks
related to the collection and processing of personal data by centralised intermediaries.3  As a
response to the issues regarding privacy and data protection, the European Union (EU)
regulators drafted the GDPR to give more control for individuals over their personal data by
setting obligations for centralised intermediaries regarding collection and processing of
personal data. Early blockchain developers also recognised the issues arising from
1 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016]
OJ L119/1.
2 Roberta Filippone, ‘Blockchain and Individuals’ Control over Personal Data in European Data Protection Law’
(Master's Thesis, Tillburg University 2017) 6-7 <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=143638> accessed 20 June 2018.
3 The scandal was about inappropriate collection of personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users by Cambridge
Analytica. The data was allegedly used in political campaigns in the US without permission of the data subjects.
On the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal see eg Harry Davis, ‘Ted Cruz using firm that harvested data
on millions of unwitting Facebook users’ (The Guardian 11 December 2015) < www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/11/senator-ted-cruz-president-campaign-facebook-user-data> accessed 20 June 2018.
2
centralisation although the privacy issues were not the only concern for them.4 Blockchain
developers took a completely different approach for the issues – eliminate the centralised
intermediaries, ‘the middle-men’. Distributed ledger technologies, such as the blockchain
technology, enable individuals to transact directly with each other, peer-to-peer, without the
middle-men. Thus, it could be said that regulators and blockchain developers had a common
objective to give individuals more control over their data although they had entirely different
approaches.5 However, the fundamentally different approaches have resulted in several tensions
between the GDPR and blockchain technology.
The GDPR was a necessary reform of which one of the main objectives was to harmonise
fragmented national data protection laws in the EU. The GDPR with some new rights and
obligations, the extraterritorial effect, and considerable administrative sanctions is a clear
statement by the EU that data protection should be taken seriously. On the one hand, companies
have started to pay attention to their privacy policies and how to comply with the regulation,
and on the other hand, the GDPR has raised awareness among natural persons of their rights as
data subjects. As the blockchain technology is a rather new technology, its potential has been
recognised only in recent years. That explains why the GDPR was not drafted taking account
of this novel decentralised technology. In any case, the GDPR is technologically neutral
regulation, and blockchain technology is not an exception.6 The technology must take data
protection of individuals and the GDPR seriously since the regulation risks becoming an
obstacle for a broad introduction of this potentially revolutionary technology.
A blockchain is an append-only distributed ledger used to record data of transactions into
packages called ‘blocks’. The blocks are linked together in a chronological order forming a
chain of blocks, thus the name blockchain.7 The data stored and processed on blockchains may
also contain personal data. As the threshold for what constitutes personal data is rather low,
blockchain applications might trigger the GDPR more often than blockchain developers had
4 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 1  <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>
accessed 29 June 2018.
5 Filippone (n 2) 6-7.
6 Recital 15 of the GDPR.
7 John Salmon and Winston Maxwell, ‘A guide to blockchain and data protection’ (Hogan Lovells, September
2017) 6 <www.hlengage.com/_uploads/downloads/5425GuidetoblockchainV9FORWEB.pdf> accessed 30 June
2018.
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believed.8 Processing personal data on blockchain raises many controversial aspects regarding
the GDPR, for instance, in relation to the principle of accountability, the principle of data
minimisation, and the principle of storage limitation.9 One of the most fundamental problems
is, however, the conflict between the right to erasure under the GDPR and the ‘immutability’
of blockchain technology.
1.2 Research problem, scope of the study, and structure
Considering that blockchain technology has great potential to change our lives in different areas
from casting votes in elections to administering land registries and facilitating machine-to-
machine communication10, to name a few, it is worth examining the issues in relation to the
GDPR as they might hinder the development of this possibly revolutionary technology. This
master’s thesis is focusing on one of the most problematic issues regarding blockchain and the
GDPR – the conflict between the right to erasure and the immutability of blockchain. According
to Article 17 of the GDPR, data subjects have a right to have their personal data erased under
certain circumstances. This right is known as the right to erasure or the right to be forgotten.
However, the more accurate term ‘right to erasure’ is used hereinafter in this thesis.11 The
blockchain technology is in apparent conflict with the right to erasure because one of the main
features of blockchains is the ‘immutability’,12 which means that removing or altering old
blocks is extremely difficult if not practically impossible. The purpose of this research is to
study the conflict and solutions proposed to resolve it in order to find out whether the conflict
could be reconciled. Based on that purpose, the research questions of this thesis ask: considering
different solutions proposed to reconcile the conflict between the right to erasure under Article
17 of the GDPR and the ‘immutability’ of public and permissionless blockchains, what is the
legal situation now and how could potentially remaining issues be addressed?
8 Luis-Daniel Ibáñez, Kieron O'Hara and Elena Simperl, ‘On Blockchains and the General Data Protection
Regulation Brief Introduction to Blockchain Technologies’ (University of Southampton 2018) 12 <
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/422879/1/BLockchains_GDPR_4.pdf> accessed 20 September 2018.
9 Filippone (n 2) 32.
10 More on how blockchain technology could change our lives see eg. Phillip Boucher, ‘How Blockchain
Technology Could Change Our Lives’ (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017).
11 The label of Article 17 of the GDPR contains both terms, but the right to be forgotten is in brackets. The term
right to be forgotten is more well-known and more used in academic literature, but it has been criticised for being
misleading. For instance, Markou has listed ten reasons why the term right to be forgotten should not be used at
all. See Christiana Markou, 'The 'Right to Be Forgotten': Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten' in Serge
Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul De Hert (eds), Reforming European Data Protection Law (Springer 2015).
12 The term immutable has been criticised as misleading, but it is the most commonly used term to describe this
feature, and in the absence of better term it is used hereinafter in this thesis. See n 45.
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Some demarcations concerning the scope of this research are in order. It is essential to
understand that there are different blockchain types depending on who has access to the
blockchain and who can act as a verifier and maintain the blockchain network. This research is
limited to the public and permissionless blockchain technology because it represents a more
traditional form of the blockchain technology, which is closer to genuine decentralised peer-to-
peer networks than other more private blockchain types that require, at least to some extent, the
involvement of trusted third party in the operation of the blockchain. Secondly, the public and
permissionless blockchain technology is more challenging and interesting regarding privacy
and data protection of natural persons than more private blockchain types because many of the
problems regarding data protection could be avoided in private and permissioned blockchains
by introducing a centralised intermediary in the process.13 Two most well-known examples of
public and permissionless blockchain technology are Bitcoin and Ethereum. The term
traditional blockchain is used hereinafter to describe public and permissionless blockchains.
This thesis begins with a brief introduction of the blockchain technology that aims to explain
what all fuss is about, what are blockchains used for, and how do they work. Chapter 3 shortly
presents the history of data protection in the EU and what changes the GDPR brought. Then, in
Chapter 4, the focus shifts to the blockchain technology and data protection at a general level.
Before even trying to understand the conflict between the right to erasure and the immutability,
it is necessary to analyse whether the GDPR applies to blockchain technology and in case it
does, who should be responsible for compliance with the regulation in such decentralised
systems. After that analysis, this research moves on to study the right to erasure and the conflict
between the right and the immutability of traditional blockchains in Chapter 5. This Chapter
seeks to give a proper insight into the right erasure to help to understand the conflict. After that,
the thesis moves on to analyse some legal and technological solutions proposed to reconcile the
conflict. Based on that analysis, it is considered whether traditional blockchains infringe Article
17 and how to address potentially existing problems to enable further development of traditional
13 FWJ Van Geelkerken and K Konings, ‘Using Blockchain to Strengthen the Rights Granted through the
GDPR’(Lviv Polytechnic National University, December 2017) 458, 459
<http://ena.lp.edu.ua/bitstream/ntb/40463/2/2017_F_W_J_van_Geelkerken-Using_Blockchain_458-461.pdf>
accessed 30 June 2018; Michèle Finck, ‘Blockchains and Data Protection in the European Union’ (2017) 10(1)
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series 6
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3080322> accessed 30 June 2018.
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blockchains without compromising data subjects’ right to erasure. Finally, in the last chapter,
the findings are summed up, and some concluding remarks are made.
1.3 Research method and material
The primary purpose of this research is to study the conflict between the right to erasure and
the immutability of traditional blockchain technology. This research does not settle for
identifying issues but instead aims to take an optimistic approach by trying to find ways to
address the issues. It is necessary to look into the underlying issue between the problems of the
GDPR and the blockchain technology to understand better the conflict between Article 17 and
the immutability of blockchain technology. That underlying issue is about balancing between
the data protection of individuals and the promotion of innovation. Regarding methodology,
this research aims to rely on law and economics approach, which enables to use legal dogmatic
approach for identifying the content of the law before moving to assess and criticise the law
from the point of view of efficiency.14 Thus, before considering the efficiency of the new data
protection regulation in relation to the traditional blockchain technology, this research relies on
legal dogmatic tools to recognise the legal problem. Normative economic analysis of law
considers the need for a change, for new policy recommendations, from an economic
perspective. The notion of efficiency is used as a framework for assessing whether there is a
need for such a change.15 In the normative economic analysis, so-called Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is generally used to describe that efficiency, ‘a social state is efficient if it is no longer
possible to increase the total welfare of a society’. In other words, there is a need for change if
it is possible to increase ‘the total welfare of a society’ by creating enough benefits for some
individuals while compensating the loss caused to others.16
This research balances between the data protection of natural persons and the promotion of
innovation and argues that there is a need for change. The change is not about reforming the
GDPR or drafting a new blockchain-specific regulation, but instead, the change is about
interpretation. The issues cannot be solved by interpreting purely literally the provisions of the
14 Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law, (Hart Publishing 2011) 38.
15 Alessio M Pacces and Louis T Visscher, ‘Methodology of Law and Economics’ in Bart van Klink and Sanne
Taekema (eds), Law and Method : Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Mohr Siebeck 2011) 88.
16 Pacces and Visscher (n 15)  89.
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GDPR. Instead, there is a need for flexible interpretations, which consider the specific
characteristics of blockchain technology but also guarantee a sufficient level of protection for
data subjects. This research focuses on providing flexible interpretations especially for legal
problems in relation to the right to erasure and the immutability of traditional blockchains.
The source material for this research consists of hard and soft law EU instruments, including
the GDPR and Article 29 Working Party opinions17. As regards to the case law, two most
important cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) are the Google Spain18
and Breyer19 case. Regarding academic discussion pertaining to the issues between the
blockchain technology and the GDPR, there are a few articles written by legal scholars, which
are an important source of this thesis. In addition to the legal instruments and academic sources,
a relevant source for this research is technological white papers written by blockchain
developers.
2 A brief introduction to blockchain technology
2.1 What all the fuss is about?
‘The blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that can be
programmed to record not just financial transactions but virtually everything of value.’20
The story of blockchain began of the white paper of unknown author or group of authors under
the name Satoshi Nakamoto.21 Although the term blockchain was not used in the white paper
that described the concept and technical details of Bitcoin, which was the first decentralised
cryptocurrency, the white paper can be regarded as a starting point for the development of the
blockchain technology. Bitcoin technology combined already existing technological
17 The European Data Protection Board (EDBP) was set to continue the work of Article 29 Working Party, as from
25 May 2018.
18 Case C‑131/12 Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja González EU:C:2014:317.
19 Case C‑582/14 Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland EU:C:2016:779.
20 Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, Blockchain revolution: how the technology behind bitcoin is changing money,
business, and the world, (Penguin, 2016).
21 Nakamoto (n 4).
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innovations in a creative way.22 The cryptocurrencies are the first and the most well-known use
case of blockchain technology. Nevertheless, more on more potential use cases for the
technology have been identified.
The next chapter in the story of blockchain was the smart contracts. Blockchain technology has
developed in the recent years so that it is possible to create new types of blockchain-based smart
contracts. Smart contracts are encoded on blockchain and can automatically enforce and
execute predetermined terms of contracts. This enables individuals to make contracts with each
other without any middle-men in a cheap and quick manner. Smart contracts can be envisioned,
for instance, to enforce wills and other agreements or to enable the Internet of Things devices
to operate and share information with each other autonomously.23 The most well-known
platform for smart contract applications is Ethereum, which was released in 2014.24
Next focus on the development of blockchain technology is said to be on ‘blockchain
applications beyond currency, finance, and markets – particularly in the areas of government,
health, science, literacy, culture, and art’.25 The blockchain has potentially disruptive impacts
on digital services and existing business models, which has been recognised among others by
the European Commission, which has already taken action by launching the EU Blockchain
Observatory and Forum and by funding blockchain projects.26
Even though the disruptive potential of blockchain technology has been widely recognised,
there seems to be a need for some clarifications. Firstly, a blockchain is essentially just a shared
database. The blockchain technology is not a magical tool for creating value for any use case,
but rather the decision to use blockchain technology should be based on thorough consideration
22 Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex
Cryptographia’ (2015), 5 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664> accessed 29 June
2018.
23 Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell, ‘Contracts Ex Machina.’ (2017) 67(2) Duke Law Journal 313, 335-36
<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3913&context=dlj> accessed 29 June 2018 .
24 Ethereum is ‘a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed
without a possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference’ <https://ethereum.org/> accessed
2 July 2018.
25 Melanie Swan, Blockchain: Blueprint for a new economy, (O’Reilly Media Inc 2015) Preface ix.
26 Commission, ’European Commission launches the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum’ (Press release 2018)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-521_en.htm> accessed 26 June 2018.
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of whether blockchain is genuinely necessary and better option than existing ones.27 Secondly,
the technology does not live up to the hype yet. There are still several technical issues that need
to be solved before the technology can be adopted as widely as imagined in many descriptions
of the potential use cases.28 However, the technology is developing rapidly, and developers are
continuously working to solve these issues.29 Despite the rapid development, it seems likely
that blockchain technology will not suddenly disrupt digital services and business models, but
instead ‘the blockchain revolution’ might be a gradual process, and, as with the development
of the Internet, it might take decades to reshape our economies.30
2.2 Different types and use cases of blockchains
The blockchain technology can be regarded as disruptive on two fronts. Firstly, the blockchain
technology might challenge existing platform economies and be the ‘next step in the peer-to-
peer economy’.31 Here, the value of the blockchain technology is at enabling unknown or
untrusted parties to transact with each other without a need for middle-men to create trust, but
instead, the technology provides the trust between the parties. Bitcoin is the most well-known
use case of the traditional blockchain technology, but many other use cases beyond
cryptocurrencies can be imagined. For instance, traditional blockchains could disrupt current
sharing economies by replacing intermediaries such as Airbnb or Uber with blockchain
technology.32 These disruptive visions of traditional blockchains require a significant further
development of the technology before the impacts could be seen in our society and everyday
life.33 As already mentioned, this is more likely a rather long gradual process than a sudden
change.
27 The blockchain cannot compete with traditional databases when it comes to confidentiality and performance.
However, blockchain might be viable solution, if there is a need for disintermediation and robustness. See eg
Gideon Greenspan, ‘Blockchains vs centralized databases’ (Multichain, 17 March 2016)
<www.multichain.com/blog/2016/03/blockchains-vs-centralized-databases/> accessed 26 June 2018; David
Bakker, ‘Blockchain in transit?’ (UL Transaction Security Blog, 2 June 2016) < https://blog.ul-
ts.com/posts/blockchains-in-transit/> accessed 26 June 2018.
28 One of the main technical issues is the scalability; current technology does not enable blockchain network to
process enough transactions per second (tps) (current maximum being 7 tps). For example, VISA enables to
process typically 2,000 tps and maximum is even 10,000 tps. Other issues relate block size and bandwidth, latency,
vulnerability to 51-percent attack, and so forth. See Swan (n 25) 81-83.
29 Swan (n 25) 84.
30 Marco Iansiti and Karim Lakhani, ’The Truth About Blockchain’ (2017) 95(1) Harvard Business Review 118,
121.
31 Wright and De Filippi (n 22) 4.
32 Finck (n 13) 9.
33 Boucher (n 10) 22.
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Secondly, the blockchain technology is used by ‘mainstream actors’ such as companies, banks,
and governments to bring operational efficiencies to their businesses.34 Here, the blockchain is
not genuinely decentralised as it is controlled by centralised administrators, but it can be used
to reduce operational costs by facilitating record keeping and transaction reconciliation.35 The
value of the permissioned blockchain technology is not at creating trust between unknown
parties but instead at providing transparent and immutable databases while maintaining control
over the network and databases. For instance, Ripple is a real-time gross settlement system
based on blockchain technology that has brought together several financial institutions around
the globe to settle their transactions securely, in real-time and at a lower cost compared to
current multi-day processing.36 An excellent example from the government level is the Swedish
land registry project, which investigates the possibilities to use permissioned blockchains to
create faster and more transparent real estate transactions.37 Permissioned blockchains offer
many advantages compared to their permissionless counterparts in relation to performance,
scalability, cost efficiency, and governance.38 However, permissioned blockchains are criticised
for being closer to traditional centralised databases than to the original idea of blockchain as a
decentralised database. In the short term, permissioned blockchains are more exciting and offer
more value for investors than traditional blockchains because permissioned blockchain
technology is technically more mature and ready for companies and governments to adopt.39
Above made distinction between permissionless (traditional) and permissioned blockchain
technology illustrates important differences between two main blockchain types. There are a
great number of terms to describe different types of blockchains; opaque or transparent, open
or closed, private or public, and so forth. Essentially there are, however, even four different
types of blockchain.40 The differences between blockchain types depend on who has access to
34 Boucher (n 10) 5.
35 Brant Carson and others, ‘Blockchain beyond the hype: What is the strategic business value?’ (McKinsey &
Company, June 2018) <www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/blockchain-
beyond-the-hype-what-is-the-strategic-business-value> accessed 30 June 2016.
36 Finck (n 13) 8.
37 Magnus Kempe, ‘The Land Registry in the blockchain’(Report of a development project with Lantmäteriet,
Telia Company, ChromaWay and Kairos Future, July 2016) <http://ica-
it.org/pdf/Blockchain_Landregistry_Report.pd> accessed 30 June 2018.
38 ‘What is Permissioned Blockchain Network?’ (Monax) <https://monax.io/learn/permissioned_blockchains/>
accessed 30 June 2018.
39 Carson and others (n 35).
40 There are different views of how many blockchain types there are. This research presents four different types as
that represents the most exhaustive illustration of different blockchain types. Another common way to present
different blockchain types is to divide them into three types; public, private and consortium blockchains. In this
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the blockchain and who can act as a validator and maintain the blockchain network
(permissioned or permissionless), and whether the blockchain is run on a private network or the
Internet (private or public).




The ledger is run on a private network and governed by one
or more administrators. Use requires joining to the private






The ledger is run on a private network governed by one or
more administrators. Use does not require permission to join






The ledger is run publicly on the Internet and governed by
one or more administrators. Use requires joining to the






The ledger is run publicly on the Internet, not owned or
governed by any administrator, and open for anyone to join.
Bitcoin and Ethereum
Table of different blockchain types.41
This research focuses on the public and permissionless blockchain technology because it is the
most decentralised and ‘purest’ type of blockchain representing the original objectives of the
early blockchain developers – to eliminate middle-men. The permissionless and public
blockchain technology is also the most challenging type in respect of data protection because
in other types many of the data protection issues can be solved by relying on some trusted third
party.42 The immutability is a concern in particular for traditional blockchains. In more private
versions of blockchains, the solutions for erasing old data are much easier to come by because
model public blockchain is used to enable peer-to-peer transaction without a need for a middle-men, private
blockchain is controlled by one entity, for instance., multinational company aiming to unify its databases among
its subsidiaries, and consortium blockchain is used by group of entities to join together in order to enhance
efficiency and reduce transactions costs. See eg Vitalik Buterin, ‘On Public and Private Blockchains’(Ethereum
Blog, 6 August 2015) < https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/> accessed 30
June 2018.
41 The table is based on a table presented in; Tuomo Kinnunen and others, Applying blockchain technology and its
impacts on transport and communications, (Publication of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
12/2017). The use case examples are from article of Finnish software development company specialising in
blockchain technology. See ‘Blockchain and GDPR: How to square privacy and distributed ledgers’ (Chainfrog,
2017) <http://www.chainfrog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/gdpr.pdf> accessed 27 June 2018.
42 Van Geelkerken and Konings (n 13) 459; Finck (n 13) 6.
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in permissioned blockchains the validators could together decide to modify data on old block
and collaborate to validate the modifications. While this provides an attractive solution for
many business and governmental blockchain projects, it conflicts with the very reason why
traditional blockchains are immutable – the users cannot independently affirm that the data is
not modified, but instead, they must trust the permissioned validators to act honestly.43 Terms
blockchain and traditional blockchain will be used hereinafter when referring to permissionless
and public blockchain technology unless otherwise specified.
2.3 Technical properties of blockchain technology
There is no perfect definition of blockchain technology because the definition and the technical
features depend on the different types and use cases of blockchains. A blockchain is often
confused with distributed ledger technology (DLT). A blockchain is one type of DLT, but
unlike in other DLTs, the database is always formed into a chain of blocks.44 This research is
focused on blockchain technology rather than on DTLs in general.
A blockchain is a distributed ledger or database formed into a chain of blocks. Each block is
composed of two separate parts; information of transactions (transactional data) and a header.
The header contains, inter alia, a timestamp, hash value of the block, and a hash value of the
previous block.45 The hash is formed by using a mathematical algorithm that forms a unique
string of letters and numbers from the transactional data of the block.46 If one letter or even
accent of the transactional data is changed, the algorithm calculates entirely different hash. As
every block also contains the hash of the previous block, the blocks are linked to each other.
Further, as only new blocks can be added to the chain, the blockchain forms ‘a chronological
database’.47 Even a slight modification of block’s data would be detected by other participants
of the network because the hash of the next block would not correspond to the data on the
43 Dave Michels, ‘Can Blockchain Operators Comply with EU Data Protection Law?’ [2018] Binary District
Journal <https://journal.binarydistrict.com/can-blockchain-operators-comply-with-eu-data-protection-law/>
accessed 19 September 2018.
44 Daniel Conte de Leon and others, ‘Blockchain: Properties and Misconceptions’ (2017) 11 Asia Pacific Journal
of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 286, 291 <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/APJIE-12-2017-
034>.
45 On more thorough presentation of blockchain architecture see eg Zibin Zheng and others, ‘An Overview of
Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends’(2017 Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers 6th International Congress on Big Data, Honolulu, 25-30 June 2017) 557, 558.
46 Conte de Leon and others (n 44) 288.
47 Salmon and Maxwell (n 7) 6.
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modified block. Data on old blocks could only be modified or erased by unbuilding the
blockchain, modifying the data, and then rebuilding the whole blockchain again, or by building
a new blockchain including the modifications. However, in order to become a valid blockchain,
this would require a majority of the network to validate the modifications, which can be
extremely difficult to achieve on the blockchain network. This feature enables to verify that
data on old blocks are not modified or tampered.48 In other words, the ledger can be regarded
as tamper-proof or immutable. In the absence of a better definition for the feature, the term
immutability is used in this thesis to refer to this feature of blockchain technology.49
A blockchain is a distributed ledger, i.e., the ledger that is not stored in a centralised data silo
but instead on computers of all participants of the blockchain network, which are called nodes.
Nodes that store the whole blockchain are full nodes whereas ‘lightweight’ nodes store only the
part of the blockchain that is relevant to them.50 A blockchain is also decentralised in a sense
that there is no need for central authorities to create a trust that the transactions on a blockchain
are valid. New transactions are broadcasted on the network and grouped into new blocks. The
trust is created by sharing the ledger to every node on the network, who automatically checks
whether the transactions in the new block are valid.51
How new block is added to the chain depends on the consensus algorithm used on the
blockchain. The purpose of the consensus algorithms is to ensure that all nodes have the same
copy of the ledger, i.e., to confirm consensus of the current state of the ledger.52 Bitcoin uses a
Proof of Work (PoW) consensus in which new blocks are added to the chain by miners who
compete against each other by solving mathematical puzzles. The one who first solves the
puzzle creates a new block and gets rewarded for the work.53 PoW consensus mechanism has
48 Matthias Berberich and Malgorzata Steiner, ‘Blockchain Technology and the GDPR – How to Reconcile Privacy
and Distributed Ledgers’ (2016) 2 European Data Protection Law Review 422, 426.
49 Terms tamper-proof and immutable have been criticized in blockchain literature. It has been argued that true
immutability does not exist as data on blockchain can be modified if there is a consensus to modify it. See eg
Gideon Greenspan, ‘The Blockchain Immutability Myth’ (Coin Desk, 9 May 2017)
<www.coindesk.com/blockchain-immutability-
myth/?utm_content=bufferdd3ca&utm_medium=social&utm_source=linkedin.com&utm_campaign=buffer>
accessed 2 July 2018.
50 Vitalik Buterin, ‘A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform’ (Ethereum White
Paper, 2014) 10 < https://www.weusecoins.com/assets/pdf/library/Ethereum_white_paper-
a_next_generation_smart_contract_and_decentralized_application_platform-vitalik-buterin.pdf> accessed 30
June 2018.
51 Boucher (n 10) 8.
52 Zheng and others (n 45) 559.
53 Nakamoto (n 4) 3.
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been heavily criticised for its energy consumption because solving the puzzles requires a
substantial amount of computational power and electricity.54 There are some other consensus
algorithms to verify the consensus of the network, such as Proof of Stake, Delegated Proof of
Stake or Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance. After a block is added to the chain, the new
version of the blockchain is distributed to every node of the network, who then updates their
versions of the blockchain to correspond with the consensus.55
Furthermore, blockchain relies on an asymmetric encryption, also known as the public-key
encryption, to verify authenticity and author of the transaction. Every user has own private key
and public key. The public key can be considered as an account number that hides the true
identity of the user. The private key, in turn, can be considered as a password that should not
be revealed to others.56  The public key and the private key are connected to each other by a
mathematical algorithm so that the public key is derived from the private key, but it is not
possible to reverse the algorithm to derive one’s private key of the public key.57 In addition to
public keys and private keys, an essential part of most blockchain protocols is digital signatures.
A digital signature is created by an algorithm that combines user’s (user sending the transaction)
private key and the data to be sent. The user does not have to send his or her private key to the
recipient of the transaction, but instead, the transaction made on the blockchain network is
signed with a digital signature.58 A common example of the digital signature and the public-
key encryption is a hypothetical situation where Alice wants to send a message to another user
Bob.59 This is a two-step process. First, Alice signs the message with her private key and then
sends the message, the digital signature and her public key to Bob. In the second phase, Bob
54 Bitcoin PoW consensus is estimated to consume same amount of electricity per year (61.4 TWh) than a country
like Switzerland. See eg. Lee Sherman, ‘Bitcoin's Energy Consumption Can Power An Entire Country -- But EOS
Is Trying To Fix That’ (Forbes, 19 April 2018) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shermanlee/2018/04/19/bitcoins-
energy-consumption-can-power-an-entire-country-but-eos-is-trying-to-fix-that/#2eee872b1bc8> accessed 30
June 2018.
55 Boucher (n 10) 5.
56 Finck (n 13) 4.
57 Leon Di, ‘Why Do I Need a Public and Private Key on the Blockchain?’ (WeTrust Blog, 29 January 2017)
<https://blog.wetrust.io/why-do-i-need-a-public-and-private-key-on-the-blockchain-c2ea74a69e76> accessed 10 July 2018.
58 ‘Blockchain Basics: How Blockchain Works - Digital Signatures’ (Lisk Academy)
<https://lisk.io/academy/blockchain-basics/how-does-blockchain-work/digital-signatures> accessed 20
September 2018.
59 Alice and Bob are fictional characters used commonly in cryptographic literature. They were originally
introduced in an article describing digital signatures and public key cryptosystems. See RL Rivest, A Shamir and
L Adleman, ‘A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems’ (1978) 21
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 120
<http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=359340.359342> accessed 30 June 2018.
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can verify two things by using the message, Alice’s public key and the digital signature; that
the message is not altered by anyone and that Alice is the original sender of the message.60
Transparency is an inherent feature of blockchain technology.61 The transparency of the
blockchain arises from the publicity of the ledger. Transactions in the ledger are publicly
available for anyone in the world to review although the identity of individuals behind the
transactions is concealed with public keys. While the transactional data can be encrypted, most
decentralised systems are designed in a manner that leaves metadata of the transactions (who
are the parties of the transactions, what kind of transaction it is, etc.) visible to anyone.62
Transparency of transactions and public keys is essential in traditional blockchains as it enables
nodes to verify transactions without a centralised party.63 Despite the fact that the public keys
are designed to hide the identity of the user, public keys cannot provide anonymity because it
is possible to identify a user from the public key with additional information.64 This is where
data protection issues may arise. The blockchain developers might have misbelieved that the
‘anonymity’ of blockchain is enough to avoid triggering data protection laws, which is not the
case as will be presented in more detail in Chapter 4.65
3 Regulation of data protection in Europe
3.1 History of data protection in Europe
Before turning to the history of data protection, it is necessary to bring some clarification to the
relationship of the right to privacy (or the right to respect for private life) and the right to data
protection. The history of the right to privacy goes much further than the history of the right to
data protection. Since the recognition of data protection as a relevant field of law, it has been
closely connected to the right to privacy. The right to data protection was subsumed into the
60 Zheng and others (n 45) 558.
61 Primavera De Filippi, ‘The Interplay between Decentralization and Privacy: The Case of Blockchain
Technologies’ (2016) 9 Journal of Peer Production 18 <http://peerproduction.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/blockchain-technologies-draft.pdf> accessed 30 June 2018.
62 De Filippi (n 61) 10.
63 De Filippi (n 61) 11.
64 Finck (n 13) 13.
65 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 7.
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right to privacy for a long time, but eventually, the rights developed into two separate
fundamental rights under the EU law.66 This distinction was recognised in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights67 (Charter), which became legally binding in 2009 when the Treaty of
Lisbon entered into force. The Charter entails separate Articles for both the right to privacy and
the right to data protection.68 The distinction was later also confirmed by the Court.69 The right
to data protection can be considered as broader right because it is triggered whenever personal
data is processed, whereas the right to respect for private life requires interference in private
life.70
Early in the 1970s, different European countries started to draft and adopt their national data
protection laws because the development of computation and automated data processing had
created a foundation for a new form of society, information society, with new risks for
individuals’ privacy.71 The Council of Europe paid attention to the same development of
information technology and soon understood that the right to privacy in Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights72 (ECHR) was insufficient to protect individuals from
such risks.73 As a response to that, the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard
to automatic processing of personal data (Convention 108) was adopted in 1981.74 It is the only
legally binding international instrument on the field data protection and still relevant as it went
recently through a process of modernisation.75 The purpose of the Convention 108 was to
provide guidance for national legislators within and even outside of the EU because it was
66 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights -
European Data Protection Supervisor, Handbook on European Data Protection Law (2018) 18-19.
67 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C/326/02. The Charter became legally binding
in 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.
68 Article 7 of the Charter (Respect for private and family life) and Article 8 of the Charter (Protection of personal
data).
69 In Digital Rights Ireland the Court held that the directive 2006/24/EC violated both fundamental rights; the right
to personal data protection and the right to respect for private life. Joined cases C‑293/12 and C-594/12 Digital
Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications
Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others EU:C:2014:238.
70 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 19.
71 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 18.
72 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1950] 213 U.N.T.S 221.
73 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Data Protesction in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg:
Constitutionalisation in Action’ in Sjaak Nouwt (ed), Reinventing data protection? (Springer 2009) 3, 5.
74 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data [1981] ETS
No 108.
75 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 17.
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drafted suitable for universal adoption.76 The same type of guidelines for national data
protection legislators, which have been more important for countries outside Europe, was
introduced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
198077.78
Despite the noble efforts by the Council of Europe and the OECD, the most comprehensive and
influential data protection instrument was adopted by the EU in 1995.79 The data protection
directive (DPD)80 was remarkable in many ways. The purpose of harmonising fragmented data
protection laws led to some extent to harmonisation even outside of the EU because many non-
EU countries used the DPD as a framework for drafting their data protection laws.81 The DPD
had two main objectives. The first objective was based on the need to harmonise national data
protection laws and enhance the efficiency of the internal market. The objective of the free flow
of data between the Member States was necessary to ensure the efficient functioning of the four
fundamental freedoms of the single market.82 The second objective was the protection of
fundamental rights and especially the right to privacy with respect to processing of personal
data. The DPD was the first directive to give a prominent role for the protection of fundamental
rights. Therefore, it was also a significant step by the EU to protect fundamental rights.83
The next important achievement in the field of data protection was the Treaty of Lisbon, which
entered into force in 2009.84 The amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon not only confirmed the
role of data protection as an independent fundamental right but also gave a new legal basis for
the EU to regulate data protection matters. Even though the DPD had an objective of protecting
fundamental rights, it was based on the internal market legal basis. Treaty of Lisbon created a
76 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 17.
77 OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data [1980] OECD/LEGAL/0188.
78 Lee Bygrave, Data privacy law: an international perspective (Oxford University Press 2014) 50.
79 Bygrave (n 78) 53.
80 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ
L281/31 (Data Protection Directive).
81 Bygrave (n 78) 53.
82 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 29.
83 Bygrave (n 78) 57.
84 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
[2007] OJ C306/1.
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comprehensive legal basis for data protection that covers all matters of EU competence.85 The
new legal basis, which can be found in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union86 (TFEU), empowered the EU to take a further step in the field of data
protection in the Union – the GDPR.87
At the beginning of this decade, globalisation and development of data processing techniques
had created new challenges for the protection of personal data. The challenges were noticed by
the Commission that released its communication of the challenges for the protection of personal
data in 2010.88 After different institutional organs of the EU had given their opinions of the
communication, the Commission drafted its proposal for the new data protection regulation in
2012. The proposal was passed to the European Parliament and the Council, which gave their
proposals for the new data protection regulation. The legislative ‘trilogue’ was completed in
2016 when the GDPR was finally approved.89 The GDPR entered into force on 25 May 2018.
3.2 What new the GDPR brought to the field of data protection?
3.2.1 The GDPR as a response to the challenges of data protection in the digital age
The GDPR is primarily a response to the challenges of the DPD. Globalisation and the
development of data processing techniques had led to problems for the DPD. Sharing
information with other individuals across the globe had become relatively easy by using
different social media services. In the meantime, governmental and commercial operators had
developed new more efficient ways to collect and process personal data, which made the
monitoring and surveillance of individuals’ online behaviour a common practice.90 The ways
of obtaining the consent for data processing had become opaque and controversial as the
85 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 28.
86 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/1.
87 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 29.
88 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal
Data Protection in the European Union’ COM (2010) 609 final 1.
89 Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, ‘The New General Data Protection Regulation: Still a Sound
System for the Protection of Individuals?’ (2016) 32 Computer Law and Security Review 179, 181.
90 European Commission (n 88) 2.
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consent was often prerequisite for using the application or the service. Furthermore, how data
was processed was often slipped into lengthy and ambiguous terms and conditions that the users
most often did not even bother to read. In short, the development had led to a situation where
individuals had no actual control over their personal data.91
The response of the GDPR to the challenges was to develop data protection definitions, rights,
obligations, principles, and so forth, to correspond better with the current data economy and
data processing techniques. The GDPR also presented new rights for data subjects and
obligations for data controllers and processors where necessary. Another main challenge of the
DPD was the unsuccessful harmonisation attempt. Despite the objective of the DPD to
harmonise national data protection laws, Member States ended up drafting diverse national laws
and, the level of data protection varied between the Member States.92 Thus, the ‘choice of
instrument’ can also be regarded as one of the main achievements of the GDPR. As the GDPR
is a regulation rather than a directive, it is directly applicable in every Member State and leaves
much less room for national legislators than the DPD did. A regulation is a more efficient tool
for harmonising data protection in the EU than a directive although the GDPR leaves some
margin of discretion for the Member States.93 De Hert and Papakonstantinou have
acknowledged, however, that the ultimate level of harmonisation will depend on many factors,
such as how the Member States use their margin of discretion and how the consistency
mechanism94 works.95
Other challenges of the DPD concerned international data transfers and applicable law,
effective enforcement, and coherence of data protection legal framework.96 Due to the limited
scope of this research, it is not possible to go in detail to each challenge and response, but two
important aspects that have attracted much attention among different stakeholders from legal
practitioners to business communities should be mentioned here. Firstly, one of the most
striking aspects of the GDPR have been the severe administrative fines, which can go up to
91 Filippone (n 2) 5.
92 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 30.
93 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 182.
94 Consistency mechanism is laid down in the GDPR under Articles 63-67. The mechanism requires all Member
States’ DPAs to cooperate with each other, withholds the EDPB the possibility to issue its opinion on the matter
if it so decides or is requested to do so, and establishes a dispute resolution system for disputes between DPAs.
95 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 182.
96 European Commission (n 88) 3-4.
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20 000 000 EUR or up to 4 % of the global turnover, whichever is higher.97 These sanctions
provide a strong incentive for companies to comply with the data protection rules beyond any
doubt. Another important aspect of the GDPR is the ‘extraterritoriality’ that has raised
controversial discussion among legal scholars.98 The scope of application of the GDPR is
extended to cover also businesses that are not established in the EU but target their products or
services to the data subjects in the EU or monitor their behaviour.99
The GDPR preserved the two main objectives of the DPD; the free flow of data and the
protection of fundamental rights, especially the protection of personal data. As described above,
the stronger fundamental rights aspect of the GDPR was empowered by the amendments of the
Treaty of Lisbon. The protection of individuals’ fundamental rights has been highlighted in an
academic discussion. The objective of the free flow of data might have been a bit overshadowed
in the discussion by the other objective, which should not diminish the importance of the free
flow of personal data. The following chapter gives a brief introduction to how the GDPR aims
to strengthen the rights and freedoms of data subjects and enhance the responsibilities of data
controllers and processors.
3.2.2 Strengthening the data protection of individuals and enhancing the responsibilities of data
controllers and processors
In order to pursue the objective of protection of fundamental rights, the GDPR seeks to
strengthen the protection of individuals by increasing transparency of data processing and by
giving more control for the individuals over their personal data.100 The GDPR strengthened the
protection of individuals primarily by specifying existing principles, rights and obligations. One
of the main clarifications concerned the definition of consent. New additions to the consent
requirements and demonstrative examples set out in Recital 32 shall improve the level of data
97 GDPR Article 83 (5).
98 The extraterritorial scope of application has been criticised as a ‘paper tiger’ because the EU lacks the
competence to enforce the data protection rules in third countries. On the other hand, the extraterritoriality is
considered necessary to prevent companies from circumventing the data protection rules by establishing outside
the EU. See  Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘A Jurisprudential Justification for Extraterritoriality in (Private)
International Law.’ (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 517, 561.
99 GDPR Article 3 (2).
100 European Commission (n 88) 6-8.
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protection.101 The GDPR also contains a new data subject right, the right to data portability.
According to the right, data subjects have the right to receive the personal data they have given
to data controllers ‘in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format’.102 Data
subjects also have the right to have that personal data transmitted to another data controller if it
is technically feasible.103 In practice, this new right seeks to provide data subjects with the right
to change service provider in an online environment.104
The specified right to erasure, the right this research focuses on, is one of the most noteworthy
provisions of the GDPR although it is not a new right per se. The right to erasure under the
GDPR is, however, more comprehensive detailing the conditions of the right, the obligation of
the data controller to inform other controllers and processors of the data subject’s request, and
the legal grounds for derogating from the right. The right could have been even more
astonishing if the Court had not surprised data protection world by stretching the right to erasure
under the DPD in its famous Google Spain case.105
What comes to the obligations of data controllers and processors in the GDPR, the purpose is
to enhance the responsibilities of data controllers and processors.106 Regarding data protection
principles, the GDPR introduced two new important principles concerning the obligations of
controllers and processors. The principle of transparency requires data controllers and data
processors to process personal data transparently. The principle of accountability requires data
controllers to be able to prove that their processing of personal data complies with the GDPR
provisions.107 These new principles illustrate a transition from the old notification system of the
DPD under which the data controllers were obliged to notify national DPA before the
processing operations towards accountability of data controller.108 New obligations that reflect
101 According to the GDPR Article 4(11), the consent means ‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous
indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her’. The GDPR added a requirement for
‘unambiguous’ indication and requirement for a ‘statement or affirmative action’. De Hert and Papakonstantinou
(n 89) 187.
102 GDPR Article 20 (1).
103 GDPR Article 20 (2).
104 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 189-190.
105 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 189.
106 European Commission (n 88) 11.
107 Christina Tikkinen-Piri, Anna Rohunen and Jouni Markkula, ‘EU General Data Protection Regulation: Changes
and Implications for Personal Data Collecting Companies’ (2018) 34 Computer Law and Security Review 134,
139.
108 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 191.
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these new principles were set for data controllers.109 According to the GDPR, data controllers
are obliged to maintain records of processing activities and to cooperate with supervisory
authority.110 To increase transparency of data processing, a new obligation to notify supervisory
authority and even data subject, in certain circumstances, of personal data breaches was
included in the GDPR.111
Another important novelty is the introduction of two new principles which aim to encourage
developers to consider data protection matters already in the initial stage of development. The
principle of data protection by design requires data controllers to implement appropriate
technical and organisational measures, which implement data protection principles, such as the
principle of data minimisation, by design.112 The data protection by default, in turn, provides
measures that by default ensure that ‘only personal data, which are necessary for each specific
purpose of the processing are processed’.113 The objective is to take into account the
possibilities of data controllers and processors to comply with their data protection obligations
already when designing applications and services.114
Other primarily administrative obligations worth mentioning are the obligation for data
controllers established outside the EU to designate a representative in the EU115, the obligation
to designate a data protection officer (DPO) in certain cases116, and the obligation to perform
data protection impact assessment (DPIA) prior to data processing if it is likely to result in a
high privacy risk117. The GDPR has been criticised for causing excessive administrative and
financial burden, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. To counter these
challenges, the GDPR specified its provisions of codes of conducts and created a new
certification mechanism to facilitate compliance with the provisions of the GDPR.118
109 Tikkinen-Piri, Rohunen and Markkula (n 107) 141.
110 GDPR Article 30 and 31.
111 GDPR Article 33 and 34.
112 GDPR Article 25 (1).
113 GDPR Article 25 (2).
114 Recital 78 of the GDPR.
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To sum up, the GDPR is a tremendous set of provisions codifying already existing data
protection practises and rules, but, on the other hand, it also contains several new important
aspects. Dealing with all the novelties of the GDPR is, however, way beyond the scope of this
research. For example, new provisions regarding international data transfers or the updated
roles and functions of DPAs and the EDPB, to name a few, would deserve greater attention.119
Certain definitions and rights that are essential with respect to blockchain technology are
examined in more detail in the following chapters.
4 Relationship between blockchain technology and the GDPR
4.1 Decentralisation as the fundamental issue
The Internet was initially envisioned as a place free of central governance and where strong
privacy prevailed. Nevertheless, the development has led to the opposite direction. Lower data
storage costs and advanced data processing techniques have increased the power of centralised
intermediaries, such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, and so forth, on the Internet.120 Moreover,
in the digital age, it is a common practice for service providers to require users to provide
personal data instead of money in exchange for using their digital services. Thus, personal data
is also considered to have economic value.121 Big centralised intermediaries collect huge
quantity of data of individuals to monitor and analyse individuals’ online behaviour. This
enables them to target their products and services more efficiently to customers and to design
more personalised services for customers. However, these benefits come at the price of
individuals’ privacy and data protection.122 Individuals are encouraged to share more and more
personal data and to consent on profiling while the centralised intermediaries keep the
underlying processing algorithms secret because disclosing those could give an advantage to
competitors.123 As Pasquale has described the situation, the individuals can be described to live
in a ‘black box society’, where centralised intermediaries are capable to monitor and control
119 On international data transfers see eg. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European
Court of Human Rights - European Data Protection Supervisor (n 66) ch 7; On the roles of DPAs and the EDPB
see eg. De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 190-91 and 193.
120 Filippone (n 2) 4-5.
121 Nicola Fabiano, ‘Blockchain and Data Protection: The Value of Personal Data’ (The 9th International Multi-
Conference on Complexity, Informatics and Cybernetics: IMCIC, Orlando, March 2018) 2
<www.nicfab.it/blockchain-data-protection/> accessed 24 July 2018.
122 De Filippi (n 61) 2.
123 De Filippi (n 61) 3.
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the behaviour of individuals and to make automated decisions on them without being required
to disclose how they do it.124 This unawareness of how personal data is used and how
individuals are profiled give rise to concerns regarding discrimination and stigmatisation.125
The strong asymmetry of power between individuals and the centralised intermediaries was
recognised not only by the regulators but also by the blockchain developers. Regulatory and
technological side share a common objective of giving more control for individuals over their
personal data.126 As described in more detail in Chapter 3, the regulators responded to the
challenges arising from centralisation by strengthening the rights and freedoms of individuals
and by enhancing the responsibilities of data controllers and processors under the GDPR.
Blockchain developers adopted a different approach based on decentralisation.127 The main idea
of decentralisation is to replace centralised intermediaries with decentralised peer-to-peer
networks. When there is no centralised intermediary and central point of control, the individuals
are in a better position to control their data. Instead of enhancing the responsibilities of
centralised operators, decentralisation aims to shift the responsibility over the data from
centralised parties to the individuals.128 Despite the common objective, this extremely different
approach of blockchain developers has raised several tensions between the technology and the
regulation.
The common problem between law and technology is that technology tends to move extremely
fast while legislation moves rather slowly. As a result, legislation is often outdated as it cannot
predict how new technologies evolve. That is the case also with blockchain technology and the
GDPR. The GDPR was not drafted taking into account decentralised architectures, such as
blockchains, where there is no single entity responsible for the data processing. Decentralisation
is the fundamental issue behind the tensions between blockchain technology and the GDPR.
Essentially, there are three main questions that should be considered to understand the
problematic relationship between blockchain technology and the new data protection
regulation:
124 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society : The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard
University Press 2015).
125 Filippone (n 2) 6.
126 Filippone (n 2) 6.
127 Filippone (n 2) 7.
128 De Filippi (n 61) 15.
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1. Does the GDPR apply to blockchain-based applications? (Question about personal data
and anonymisation)
2. Who can be a data controller or processor in a traditional blockchain network? (Question
about the allocation of responsibilities)
3. What kind of issues the blockchain technology raises in relation to data subjects’ rights
and compliance with the obligations of the GDPR? (Question about complying with
data subjects’ rights)
Here, it should be mentioned that the right to erasure is not the only controversial aspect of
blockchain technology with regard to compliance with data subjects’ rights (Question 3).
Therefore, even if the conflict with the right to erasure and immutability could be reconciled,
there could still be other issues concerning, for instance, the principle of data minimisation, the
principle of storage limitation, or to the right to access would require further attention.129
However, the scope of this research is not enough to delve into the other issues in more detail.
Questions 1 and 2, instead, are essential preliminary questions that need to be considered before
assessing the right to erasure and the immutability. Before going in detail into the three
questions, it is worth examining the claims according to which the blockchain technology could
be used to enhance the privacy and data protection of individuals.
4.2 Blockchain as a tool for enhancing individuals’ privacy and data protection
Lack of centralised intermediaries
Despite the several points of tension between blockchain and the GDPR, blockchain has also
been regarded as a or tool for enhancing individuals’ privacy and data protection.
Decentralisation represents the most apparent way in which blockchain pursues to achieve the
objective of giving individuals more control over their personal data. Lack of centralised party
that is responsible for data collection and processing reflects a shift of control from centralised
intermediaries to individuals.130 Blockchain technology could enable new access authentication
systems that give individuals more control over how they store, manage, and use their personal
data. The EU has noticed this great potential of blockchain technology to achieve the objectives
of the GDPR by alternative means.131 DECODE is a project funded by the EU that aims to
129 More on other controversial aspects of blockchain technology in regard to the GDPR see eg Finck (n 13) 20-
23.
130 De Filippi (n 61) 15.
131 Finck (n 13) 29.
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develop and pilot blockchain-based tools that allow individuals to have true control over their
personal data.132 Many other ongoing projects seem to affirm that blockchain technology has
potential to strengthen individuals’ data sovereignty, so that individuals may independently
decide when and how their personal data is processed.133 As such, the blockchain technology
could promote individuals’ privacy and data protection by giving more control to the
individuals over their personal data.
Decentralisation is also a useful tool for combatting data breaches. Data breaches have become
an increasing problem in the digital age because a single vulnerability of application or software
can lead to a data breach exposing millions of users’ personal data, including home addresses,
fingerprint data, or even credential data.134 As a result of a data breach, data subject might lose
availability to the data permanently, which constitutes a serious threat to individuals’ data
protection.135 Decentralised data storage and consensus mechanism combined with the
immutable ledger provides high security against data breaches. For example, in Bitcoin
blockchain, a successful attack would require that the attacker has more mining capacity than
the rest of the network, which would be extraordinarily energy-consuming and require
enormous computational resources.136 Even though traditional blockchains are not genuinely
immutable as, for instance, the decentralized autonomous organisation (DAO) hack proved137,
one of the most attractive features of blockchain is the effectiveness in preventing data breaches.
132 More on DECODE project see the project website <https://decodeproject.eu/> accessed 19 August 2018.
133 For instance, Neisse, Steri and Nai-Fovino have presented in their research three blockchain-based data
accountability and provenance tracking models, which enable data subjects to track controllers and processors they
have given access to the data and withdraw the consent and disable access to their data anytime. These solutions
are considered in more detail in Chapter 5.2.2 because they could be interesting in relation to complying with the
right to erasure. Ricardo Neisse, Gary Steri and Igor Nai-Fovino, ‘A Blockchain-Based Approach for Data
Accountability and Provenance Tracking’ in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability,
Reliability and Security (Association for Computing Machinery, 2017) <http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.04507>
accessed 4 September 2018.
134 Taylor Armerding, ‘The 17 biggest data breaches of the 21st century’ (CSO, January 26 2018)
<www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html> accessed
30 July 2018.
135 Filippone (n 2) 29.
136 Greenspan, ‘The Blockchain Immutability Myth’ (n 49).
137 The DAO was a decentralised venture capital fund in which investors had, at least in theory, more power as
there was no centralised board of directors or equivalent management structure. In the DAO hack, the attacker
found a loophole in the code of a smart contract that was built on the Ethereum platform, which allowed the
attacker to withdraw 3.6 million ether from the DAO. The attack was noticed by the Ethereum community, but as
updating the code would require at least 51 percent of the nodes to support it, it took time and persuasion by
community leaders for the majority to agree with the update. As a result of the hack, the Ethereum was split to
Ethereum (supported by majority of the nodes) and to Ethereum Classic (supported by the minority disagreeing
with the update). Greenspan, ‘The Blockchain Immutability Myth’ (n 49).
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Transparency
Another promising feature of blockchain technology concerning data protection and privacy is
transparency. Transparency is an inherent feature of blockchain technology.138 Transactions in
the ledger are publicly available for anyone in the world, even though the identity of individuals
behind the transactions are concealed with public keys. Transparency of transactions is essential
in traditional blockchains necause it enables validators to verify transactions without a
centralised intermediary.139 However, transparency in traditional blockchains is not limited to
publicity of transactions.
On traditional blockchains, transparency also covers the protocol level since traditional
blockchain projects are often open source. Even if the source code would not be publicly
available, the operations of the code (bytecode) are open for any node in the network to execute
and validate. Transparency at the protocol level enables individuals to be better informed what
data is collected of them and how the data is processed in contrast to more opaque data
processing operations in centralised data systems.140 While this transparency has been criticised
for the fact that most of the individuals cannot truly understand the code and evaluate its
modifications, this transparency gives at least the possibility for individuals to be well-informed
of the data processing operations and improves individuals’ possibilities to exercise their rights
as data subjects.141
The principle of transparency is one of the new principles introduced in the GDPR. The
principle requires that personal is processed transparently.142 One of the purposes of this
principle is to enable data subjects to make better use of their rights.143 The inherent
transparency of traditional blockchains seems prima facie to be in line with the principle of
transparency. According to Recital 39 of the GDPR, ‘(i)t should be transparent to natural
persons that personal data concerning them are collected, used, consulted or otherwise
processed and to what extent the personal data are or will be processed.’ Despite that blockchain
technology seems to be providing transparency to individuals in a manner which the GDPR
138 De Filippi (n 61) 8.
139 De Filippi (n 61) 11.
140 De Filippi (n 61) 8.
141  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Transparency Under Regulation 2016/679’ (2016)
WP260 6; Filippone (n 2) 33.
142 GDPR Article 5(1)(a).
143 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Transparency Under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 141)
6.
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requires, blockchain technology comes with a more obscure risk for individuals’ privacy and
data protection. Blockchain-based applications are generally designed so that there is always
some metadata relating to the transactions publicly available on the blockchain network.144
Even though pseudonymisation techniques can hide the identity of the user, there are several
methods to indirectly identify individuals from the metadata. This forms a high risk for
individuals’ privacy as every transaction is publicly available on the ledger and can be possibly
linked to a specific individual if additional information to link the metadata to the individual
can be acquired.145 As will be discussed in Chapter 4.3, transparency runs a risk of being rather
a privacy issue than a privacy-enhancing feature.
Encryption and pseudonymisation
Blockchain technology uses encryption and pseudonymisation to provide better privacy and
data protection for its users. As well described in the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines on
the anonymisation techniques, ‘(p)seudonymisation reduces the linkability of a dataset with the
original identity of a data subject; as such, it is a useful security measure but not a method of
anonymisation’.146 Pseudonymisation is reaffirmed in the GDPR as a technique that ‘can reduce
the risks to the data subjects concerned and help controllers to meet their data-protection
obligations’.147
In traditional blockchains two most commonly used pseudonymisation techniques to obscure
the content of the data stored on blockchain are encryption and hashing. Encryption can obstruct
the content of the data so that the data can only be decrypted by using a unique private key.148
Moreover, the public-key encryption is used to hide the identities of individuals transacting
with each other. Hashing, on the other hand, is a technique that transforms any size of data to
unreadable and fixed size form (hash value), which cannot be reversed back to the original
form.149 As will be discussed in more detail in the following Chapter, encrypted or hashed data
may be considered as pseudonymised data and qualify as personal data under the GDPR. It
144 De Filippi (n 61) 10.
145 Filippone (n 2) 30.
146 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (2014) WP 216
20.
147 Recital 28 of the GDPR.
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seems that the state-of-art techniques do not exempt blockchain technologies from the scope of
the GDPR but can give some leeway for processing operations.150
Pseudonymisation and encryption are mentioned in Article 32 of the GDPR as examples of the
appropriate technical and organisational measures for data controllers and processors in
ensuring the security of data processing. Encryption, although not mandatory under the GDPR,
is mentioned in several parts of the GDPR as an essential data protection measure that could be
used to mitigate the risks of data processing activities.151 Pseudonymisation, in turn, is explicitly
mentioned in Article 25 as an appropriate technical and organisational measure that is in line
with the obligation of data protection by design. Both are thus useful techniques for reducing
the risks related to data processing and facilitating compliance with the provisions of the GDPR.
While encryption and pseudonymisation are not unique features of blockchains, they are an
essential part of blockchains for achieving compliance with the GDPR. The next Chapter goes
on to consider in more detail the encryption and pseudonymisation because they have not only
been regarded as important privacy enhancing techniques but also as relevant factors in
determining whether the GDPR applies to the traditional blockchains at all or not.
4.3 Personal data and traditional blockchains
4.3.1 The notion of personal data under the GDPR
A layperson might associate personal data only with information that is particularly revealing,
such as health records, political opinions, or information on a person’s sexual life. All
aforementioned particularly revealing and sensitive data constitute personal data, and, in fact,
they are mentioned in the GDPR as special categories of personal data, which enjoy an even a
higher level of protection than more ‘common’ personal data.152 The threshold for personal data
under the GDPR may come as a surprise not only for laypersons but also for many stakeholders
in data-driven economies. As regards to the blockchain technology, the GDPR seems to have
caught blockchain developers off guard. The developers may have misbelieved that blockchain
150 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 4.
151 'GDPR encryption: what you should know and what you do not know' (I-scoop) <www.i-scoop.eu/gdpr-
encryption/> accessed 31 July 2018.
152 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 183.
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projects are exempted from the provisions of the GDPR due to the ‘anonymity’ of blockchain
technologies.153 Data processed on traditional blockchains is data which has undergone
pseudonymisation rather than anonymised data and, in many cases, considered as personal data.
The definition in Article 4(1) and in Recital 26
Personal data is defined in Article 4(1) of the GDPR as ‘any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person’. An identifiable natural person is an essential term when
assessing whether the GDPR applies or not. According to Article 4(1), ‘identifiable natural
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one
or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person’.154 The GDPR does not require actual identification of the
individual as indirect identifiability is considered enough for data to constitute personal data.155
The identifiability forms thus the threshold for what constitutes personal data.156
The definition contains a list of attributes that can identify a person directly or indirectly. Direct
identifiers, such as name or identification number, can on its own identify a natural person
whereas indirect identifiers, such as postal address, phone number or different online identifiers,
can identify a natural person only if additional information is provided.157 Article 29 Working
Party has emphasised that besides acquiring name and address, which are the most common
attributes used to identify a natural person, there are also other means of identification,
including singling out, linkability, and inference.158 For instance, web traffic surveillance tools
and online identifiers, such as IP addresses or cookies, which are explicitly mentioned in Recital
153 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 7.
154 GDPR Article 4(1)
155 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 90.
156 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data’ (2007) WP 136
12.
157 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 89.
158 Other means of identification are defined as follow in the opinion: ‘Singling out, which corresponds to the
possibility to isolate some or all records which identify an individual in the dataset; Linkability, which is the ability
to link, at least, two records concerning the same data subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same
database or in two different databases). If an attacker can establish (eg. by means of correlation analysis) that two
records are assigned to a same group of individuals but cannot single out individuals in this group, the technique
provides resistance against “singling out” but not against linkability; Inference, which is the possibility to deduce,
with significant probability, the value of an attribute from the values of a set of other attributes.’ Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques' (2014) WP 216 11-12.
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30 as attributes that may leave traces that enable to identify individuals on the basis of their
online behaviour and habits, can single out individuals without enquiring name or address.159
Identification thus covers broadly all possible ways to distinguish an individual from other
persons.160
Particular attention should be paid to the notion of identifiability because it sets the threshold
for personal data. If data is not or no longer capable of identifying a natural person, it is
considered as anonymised data and out of the scope of the GDPR. In assessing whether the data
is capable of identifying a data subject, all means reasonably likely to be used by the data
controller or by another person to directly or indirectly identify the data subject should be taken
into account.161 The criterion of the means reasonably likely to be used is further clarified in
Recital 26, ‘(t)o ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural
person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of
time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time
of the processing and technological developments.’
The notion of identifiability requires to assess what is considered as a reasonable effort to link
the data to a natural person. There has been a legal debate between two approaches. According
to an absolute approach, all possibilities of a data controller to identify a natural person should
be taken into account regardless of the likelihood of identification. It is not required that a data
controller should be able to link data to a natural person, but it is enough that someone in the
world holds the additional information necessary to identify the natural person. On the contrary,
a relative approach considers the necessary effort to identify. Thus, a purely theoretical risk of
re-identification is not covered by the definition of personal data.162 The legal scholars have not
been unanimous about which approach the GDPR represents. The GDPR can be interpreted to
support both approaches, which complicates the assessment of the notion of identifiability.163
159 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data’ (n 156) 14.
160 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 89.
161 Recital 26 of the GDPR.
162 Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel, ‘Personal Data and Encryption in the European General Data
Protection Regulation’ (2016) 7 Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic
Commerce Law 163, 165-66
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sults> accessed 20 September 2018.
163 On the one hand, the fact that Recital 26 considers not only the possibilities of data controller to identify a
natural person from the data but also the same possibility of another person (anyone in the world) could support
absolute approach as all the necessary information to identify a natural person does not have to be in the hands of
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However, some guidance can be found from the case law of the Court and the Opinion of Article
29 Working Party as discussed below.
In Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the Court clarified the notion of indirect
identifiability and the criterion of means reasonably likely to be used.164 The case concerned
dynamic IP addresses, which are assigned by Internet Service Providers (ISP) to customers and
which change every time a customer connects to the internet. Mr Breyer contested practice of
German federal institutions to store dynamic IP addresses of persons accessing websites run by
the federal institutions. The additional information required to identify individuals accessing
the websites was held by a separate ISP.165
The Court ruled that identifiability does not require that all information should be in the hands
of one person. It considered that dynamic IP addresses could constitute personal data if the
website provider ‘has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional
data which the internet service provider has about that person’.166 The Court ruled that there
were legal means to access the additional information. The national law did not directly allow
to transmit the additional data, but in the event of a cyber attack, the website provider could
turn to authorities to get access to the additional data in order to initiate criminal proceedings.167
In addition to the legal means test, the Court referred to the complexity of identification as a
relevant factor in determining the level of identifiability. The Court considered that dynamic IP
addresses do not constitute personal data if identification is ‘practically impossible on account
of the fact that it requires a disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so
that the risk of identification appears in reality to be insignificant.’168
the data controller. Recital 26 makes also a specific reference to singling out as a mean of direct or indirect
identification, which could be harmful to a natural person even if it is unlikely that the data can be linked to data
subject’s name. Further, the Recital 26 states that data which have undergone pseudonymisation should be
considered identifiable information that could imply that such data is always personal data regardless of the
criterion of means reasonably likely to be used. On the other hand, the GDPR contains also many strong hints of
the relative approach, especially the use of the criterion means reasonably likely to be used and the list of objective
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The assessment of the legal means test and the complexity of the identification should be carried
out on a case-by-case basis.169 The approach the Court has taken could be seen as a ‘balanced
approach’ because it accepts that third parties hold the additional data, but only if a data
controller has legal means to access it. This approach seems to balance the burden on data
controllers and the protection of data subjects.170
Anonymisation and pseudonymisation
Anonymisation and pseudonymisation are essential terms in understanding the scope of
application of the GDPR. As regards what constitutes anonymised data, the GDPR refers to the
notion of identifiability. The idea that anonymised data escapes the scope of the GDPR is
described in Recital 26 as follows, ‘(t)he principles of data protection should therefore not apply
to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or
identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the
data subject is not or no longer identifiable.’ The GDPR does not give an explicit definition of
anonymised data, but some guidance can be found on the opinion issued by Article 29 Working
Party on the anonymisation techniques in 2014.171 Even though the opinion was given in
relation to the DPD, it still provides relevant guidance for the GDRP.
The opinion requires that the identification must be prevented irreversibly. Thus, the opinion
sets out very high standard for identification.172 This near-zero risk standard has been regarded
to be practically unachievable in the digital age.173 While the opinion acknowledges the
potential of anonymisation techniques, it is criticised for failing to provide clear guidance on
the risk of re-identification, in other words, what would be an acceptable risk of re-identification
to render data anonymous.174 For instance, Stalla-Bourdillon and Knight have argued that the
zero-risk is not attainable in the era of big data and that robust anonymisation techniques could
169 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
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provide adequate protection for data subjects even if the risk would be higher than near-zero.175
In the same vein, El Emam and Álvarez have considered that the acceptable level of re-
identification should not be a practically unachievable zero-risk requirement, but more suitable
description would be ‘a very small risk of re-identification’.176 Many legal scholars seem to
agree that there is a need for a more flexible approach that considers the necessary effort to
identify a natural person.
Pseudonymisation has a twofold meaning in the GDPR. As discussed in Chapter 4.2, the
pseudonymisation is an important privacy-enhancing technique, which is not necessarily
compulsory but is a convenient way for data controllers to demonstrate compliance with the
GDPR.177 Pseudonymisation is a process to disguise individuals’ identities by replacing certain
attributes, such as name, e-mail address, or sex in the dataset with a pseudonym.178
Pseudonymisation is defined in the GDPR as ‘processing of personal data in such a manner that
the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of
additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person’.179 In practice, pseudonymisation
requires that the keys to decrypt the data are kept separate from the data by using different
databases for the data and the keys, and by organisational measures by recording and limiting
the persons who have access to both the keys and the data.180
On the other hand, pseudonymisation has also been considered as a relevant factor in
determining what constitutes personal data. According to Recital 26, ‘(p)ersonal data which
have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of
additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural
175 Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon and Alison Knight, ‘Anonymous Data v. Personal Data - False Debate: An EU
Perspective on Anonymization, Pseudonymization and Personal Data’ (2016) 34 Wisconsin International Law
Jouurnal 284, 307.
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2016) 10, 30.
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person’.181 This could be interpreted to mean that data which have undergone pseudonymisation
always constitute personal data. Article 29 Working Party has acknowledged that
pseudonymisation does not suffice to render data anonymised, even though pseudonymisation
can reduce the linkability of a dataset with the original identity of an individual.182 This
interpretation would undermine the notion of identifiability and the criterion of means
reasonably likely to be used to identify. What comes to encryption techniques, this
interpretation would mean that encrypted data could never be anonymised because encryption
constitutes a pseudonymisation technique under the GDPR.183 Before the GDPR was finally
approved, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) warned that
pseudonymisation should not be linked to the definition of personal data by including it in
Recital 26 because that would cause legal uncertainty about the definition of personal data.184
Even though there have been different opinions whether pseudonymisation could render data
anonymous or not, the opinion that data which have undergone pseudonymisation could be
anonymised seem to prevail.185 De Hert and Papakonstantinou have argued that despite the
connection between pseudonymisation and the definition of personal data, it should be possible
to render data which has undergone pseudonymisation anonymous because such data is
considered as ‘information on an identifiable natural person’ and subject to the criterion of
means reasonably likely to be used to identify a natural person.186 All in all, there seem to be
legal uncertainties about the definition of personal data. The Breyer case provided some
guidance for the notion of identifiability, but still, the question about anonymisation and the
acceptable risk of re-identification remains uncertain. Linking the pseudonymisation to Recital
26 and the definition of personal data further complicates the matter.
181 In contrast to the Council proposal of the GDPR, the final version of the GDPR does not contain the term
pseudonymised data.
182 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 146) 20.
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4.3.2 Personal data on blockchains
In considering whether blockchain-based applications process personal data, it must be
acknowledged that there are different use cases of blockchain technologies some of which may
process personal data while others do not. Salmon and Maxwell have illustrated this by dividing
blockchain projects into three categories depending on the use of personal data. The first
category covers blockchain projects that process data that is not directly or indirectly related to
any individual, i.e., anonymised data. Blockchains could be used for example to store bills of
lading or diamond certificates.187 Here, it should be noted that the GDPR does not protect legal
persons, so contact details or even trade secrets of companies could be stored on a blockchain
without triggering the GDPR.188 The other two categories cover blockchain projects that
process personal data but to a varying degree. Blockchains could be designed to especially
process personal data and even sensitive personal information. On the other hand, some
blockchains may process any type of data, which may also contain personal data.189 For
instance, Bitcoin allows writing any information in a separate field of the transaction.190 The
last two categories are in the focus of this research because they could trigger the application
of the GDPR.
The broad definition of ‘processing’ catches different operations performed on personal data
including collection, storage, alteration, dissemination, and so forth.191 As storing is considered
processing, all data stored on blockchains are processed.192 A noteworthy exception to the
processing of personal data is that the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data
that is done ‘in the course of purely personal or household activity’.193 Thus, the regulation
requires at least some connection to a professional or commercial activity.194 The Court has
interpreted the household exemption narrowly in the Bodil Lindqvist case ruling out the
applicability of the household exemption in situations where the data is published on the
187 Salmon and Maxwell (n 7) 21.
188 Recital 14 of the GDPR.
189 Salmon and Maxwell (n 7) 21.
190 Natalie Eichler and others, ‘Blockchain, Data Protection, and the GDPR’(Blockchain Bundesverband, 25 May
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Internet and made accessible to an indefinite number of people.195 Considering that traditional
blockchain applications require certain metadata to be publicly available on the Internet, the
household exemption seems not applicable for such blockchains. Further, many use cases seem
to involve commercial activities because they are related to different types of commercial
transactions.
The data on blockchains can be categorised in two sets of data possibly qualifying as
‘information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, in other words, as personal
data.196 Many blockchain-based applications process transactions between pseudonymous
individuals. Transactions may be transfers of cryptocurrencies or, in case of smart contracts,
executions of smart contract functions.197 Transactional data refers to a data relating to the
content of the transactions, for instance., financial or medical information or information related
to digital identities. Transactional data often contains information relating directly or indirectly
to individuals.198 Metadata is another category of data processed on blockchains that runs the
risk of constituting as personal data. In the context of blockchain, metadata relates to
transactions carried out on a blockchain network, for instance, information on who are the
sender and receiver of the transaction. In the following paragraphs, these two categories are
analysed separately to understand whether they constitute personal data under the GDPR.
Transactional data can be stored in a blockchain in three forms. Firstly, transactional data can
be stored in plain text in a blockchain. That is not an efficient way of storing transactional data
in a blockchain because storing data in plain text requires a lot of storage capacity. It is not
advisable from the data protection perspective either because storing transactional data that
contains personal data in plain text to a blockchain constitutes obviously personal data.199
Secondly, data can be stored in a blockchain in encrypted form. Traditional blockchains rely on
the public-key encryption. Encryption allows storing transactional data in a blockchain so that
only the person holding the private key can decrypt the data. Article 29 Working Party has
considered in its opinion that encryption of data can provide a high degree of security because
195 Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist EU:C:2003:596, para 47.
196 Finck (n 13) 10.
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it renders the data unintelligible for persons that do not have access to the decryption key.
However, it has concluded in the same opinion that encryption does not eliminate the possibility
to identify a natural person as long as the private key or original data are available (even if held
by trusted key escrow service).200 Furthermore, a brute force attack201 could be used to decrypt
the data.202 However, it could be contested whether a brute force attack would qualify as means
reasonably likely to be used to identify an individual.203 Article 29 Working Party has
considered that encryption cannot irreversibly prevent identification, and, thus, it is rather a
pseudonymisation than anonymisation technique.204 Due to the high threshold for
anonymisation, many legal scholars have considered that storing transactional data in a
blockchain in encrypted form is likely to constitute personal data under the GDPR.205
Lastly, transactional data can be hashed to a blockchain. Hashing data on a blockchain allows
subsequent validation of the data by comparing it to the hash. For instance, hashed data could
be used in timestamping services to prove that specific document existed at a particular time.206
Hashed data provide stronger privacy than encryption because hashed data cannot be reverse-
engineered.207 A hash function is, however, also considered as a pseudonymisation technique
by the Article 29 Working Party because the hashed data and the original data can be linked
together by hashing the original data again (will result in same hash).208 Therefore, blockchain-
based applications should pay attention to storing the original data because if it is leaked or
otherwise acquired by third parties, it is rather easy to link transactions to that data by reviewing
transaction history.209 Some legal scholars have considered that the high threshold for
anonymisation is likely to trigger the application of the GDPR even if personal data is hashed
to a blockchain.210
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It seems that on traditional blockchains transactional data cannot be fully anonymised because,
if the data is truly anonymised, nodes could not verify transactions.211 Nevertheless, some legal
scholars have considered that even encrypted or hashed data could constitute anonymised data
if there are no means reasonably likely to be used to identify a natural person. Particular
emphasis should be put on who controls the information necessary to identify an individual. If
such information is only held by the user (data subject), it could be argued that encrypted or
hashed data is personal data only to the user and anonymised data for everyone else.212
However, another problem arises in relation to encrypted data. Recital 26 of the GDPR requires
to take account of the development of technology when assessing the means reasonably likely
to be used to identify. The Article 29 Working Party has clarified that future technological
advancements should be considered for ‘the period for which the data will be processed’.213 In
the context of blockchain, data is often processed for an unlimited period of time. Thus,
technological developments such as quantum computers, which could break even high-level
state-of-art encryption, should be considered when assessing the criterion of means reasonably
likely to be used to identify a natural person. This could imply that storing personal data in
encrypted form in a blockchain could not constitute anonymised data if the data is stored for an
unlimited period. On the other hand, blockchain developers are already developing solutions
for quantum computers.214
Another set of data stored in blockchains that may qualify as personal data is metadata.
Transparency of metadata is an inherent feature of traditional blockchains. Certain metadata
must be publicly available on the blockchain to enable validators to verify transactions. In other
words, the transparency of metadata is a necessity on blockchain networks to coordinate the
behaviour of unrelated individuals and create trust between the individuals without centralised
intermediaries.215 Blockchain technologies rely on the public-key encryption to mitigate the
apparent privacy issues stemming from such transparency. Public keys are essential elements
of the metadata that is used for validating transactions.216
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The public keys are used on blockchains to enable pseudonymous identification for
transactional purposes.217 Even though users’ real-world identities are disguised with
pseudonyms, blockchains cannot provide transactional privacy. Every public key is linked to a
published transaction, and values of all transactions and balances of every public key are
publicly available on a blockchain for anyone to observe.218 Due to the pseudonymous nature
of the public keys, they cannot directly identify a natural person. However, public keys may
indirectly identify a natural person if additional information can be attained and combined with
the public key.219 Here, the notion of identifiability and the criterion of means reasonably likely
to be used are relevant in considering whether the public keys are considered as personal data.
As explained above, the Court clarified the notion of indirect identifiability in the Breyer case.
Applying the ruling on the case of public keys, public keys can be considered as personal data
if a data controller holding the public key has legal means (not prohibited by the law) to acquire
additional information to identify the individual, and such means are not too complicated, i.e.,
in reality, the risk of re-identification is not insignificant considering the necessary effort in
time, cost and manpower to identify the individual.220
There are various means for acquiring additional information that could identify a natural
person when combined with the person’s public key. Anyone transacting with a user, be it e-
commerce website, cryptocurrency exchange or just a friend, will get to know at least one of
the user’s public keys.221 It has become more and more common to use different service
providers, such as online wallets or cryptocurrency exchanges, which collect information that
enables to link public keys to users’ real-world identities. These service providers may be
obliged to collect the additional information in order to comply with Know Your Customer and
Anti Money Laundering obligations.222 Some users even publish their cryptocurrency addresses
voluntarily online to receive donations, which may link their address to their real-world
identity.223 In addition to the different forms of collection and voluntary disclosures of
additional information, various data analysis techniques have been developed to deanonymize
especially cryptocurrency transactions. Researchers have found out for example that Bitcoin
addresses could be linked to the users’ IP addresses, which in turn could be linked to the users’
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real identities.224 Law enforcement agencies have already proved that they can identify
individuals behind Bitcoin transactions.225
Here, the criterion of means reasonably likely to be used to identify becomes crucial again.
Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl have underlined that attention should be paid to who holds the
additional information necessary to identify the individual from public keys.226 Finck has
considered that the Breyer case affirms the interpretation that public keys qualify as personal
data because all the data necessary to identify a natural person does not have to be in the hands
of one person, but instead it suffices that information exchanges or other service providers hold
the additional information.227 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl have taken a more flexible approach
by arguing that if the users themselves generate and manage their public and private keys as
initially envisioned for traditional blockchains, the public keys will not constitute personal data.
Nonetheless, a common practice is that users rely on centralised third parties for key
management. These wallet services collect information that enables to link the public key to a
natural person. If a situation similar to Breyer case arises, additional information to identify an
individual from the public key could be acquired from the wallet service provider by legal
means, which are not too complicated.228 In other words, when users rely on key management
services or other service providers, which collect information to link their public keys to their
real-world identities, there may be means reasonably likely to be used to identify a natural
person from the public key.
In addition to the above-described possibility to identify a natural person from the public keys,
the public availability of metadata and transaction history may cause another risk of re-
identification. It is possible that public keys could single out a natural person if they are
combined with other information, such as e-mail addresses, credit card data or IP addresses.
This other information could be accessed from service providers that enable customers to pay
with cryptocurrencies.229 While there is not necessarily legal means for anyone who access the
public key from the publicly available transaction history to acquire additional information from
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the service providers, the public key could be personal data for the service providers because
they have access to both the public key and the other information necessary to identify a natural
person. Data analysis techniques could help these service providers to associate users’ public
keys and to single out individuals by combining public keys with other available information.230
Even if there would be legal means to identify, it should be further assessed whether using these
techniques to single out a natural person would be regarded as means reasonably likely to be
used to identify a natural person, considering the necessary effort in time and cost.
4.3.3 Technological solutions for better protection of individuals privacy and data protection
Many traditional blockchain applications process personal data and must comply with the
provisions of the GDPR as discussed above. Several technological solutions have been
proposed to provide more privacy for individuals transacting on blockchain networks. So far,
most of the solutions have focused on improving users’ privacy, whereas the issues concerning
data protection have received attention only recently.231 Nevertheless, these solutions are not
only interesting from the privacy perspective but also from the perspective of data protection.
Some of the solutions could help to comply with the obligations of the GDPR and some possibly
render data anonymous.
The transparency of transactions and metadata is a problem on the most basic level of
blockchain, i.e., on the protocol or the consensus layer, which does not prevent technologists
from developing more advanced encryption and obfuscation methods on top of that layer.232
Many blockchain applications already rely on hashing and encryption techniques to mitigate
issues arising from the transparency. In that regard, the interesting question is whether advanced
encryption methods could qualify as anonymisation techniques in the future. At the moment,
there is legal uncertainty of the actual threshold of anonymisation. However, the requirement
that identification should be irreversibly prevented sets a considerably high standard for
anonymisation. There is clearly a need for legal certainty as what could be considered as an
acceptable risk of re-identification.233
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Some of the most discussed and exciting solutions are presented briefly below to give a glimpse
of the proposed technological solutions; some of them can help to comply with the GDPR,
others provide more privacy for users by obscuring the receiver or the sender of the transaction
or the amount sent. Cryptocurrencies are the most advanced use case of blockchain technology,
and so many of the leading solutions providing more anonymity in blockchain transactions have
been proposed regarding cryptocurrencies.
Name of the solution Description
Hashing-out Storing transactional data on encrypted external off-chain storage controlled by a third party while
only hashes of that data are stored on the actual blockchain. It has been described as one of the
most prominent solutions because it is rather easy to deploy and greatly help to meet with
obligations of the GDPR. However, it has been criticised for ‘betraying the principle of
decentralization’ as it requires a centralised third party for controlling the off-chain storage.234
Stealth address Monero has presented a solution for hiding the destination of the transactions in a way that only
the sender and receiver may know in which address the payment was sent to. Stealth addresses
could be used for example by a website that wants to receive donations without making these
donations publicly available on the blockchain.235
Mixing technologies Mixing technologies make it more difficult to use deanonymisation techniques to link different
addresses users’ use to send and receive transactions. Decentralised peer-to-peer mixing projects,
such as CoinJoin or CoinShuffle, gather together several users to make a single transaction and so
hide the direction of transaction movement.236
Merge avoidance Merge avoidance can solve a problem that mixing services cannot, i.e., the problem of linking
user’s accounts together whenever a user spends from the accounts at the same time. While it is an
interesting solution for that purpose, the privacy it can provide has been criticised ‘highly porous
and heuristic, with nothing even close to approaching high guarantees’.237
Ring signatures The main idea behind ring signatures is to protect the identity of the sender by gathering together
a group or ‘ring’ of individuals which each own a private key that can produce a digital signature
for the transaction. This makes it much more difficult to determine which of the group member’s
private key initiated the transaction but still enables validators to validate the transaction.238
Zero-knowledge
proofs
A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic technique implementing a form of homomorphic
encryption. A zero-knowledge proof is a method by which an individual may prove to another
individual that she knows a value x without disclosing any other information except the fact that
she knows the value x. In the context of blockchain, it enables users to transact with each other
without disclosing the sender, the receiver or the transaction value to the validators. A zero-
234 Finck (n 13) 11-12; Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
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accessed 14 August 2018.
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<https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/15/privacy-on-the-blockchain/> accessed 14 August 2018.
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knowledge proof is a promising technique for different blockchain use cases, and it has been
already deployed successfully, e.g., in Z-Cash cryptocurrency.239
Secure Multi-Party
Computation
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) allows to compute over encrypted data and to hide the
content of the transactions from both the public and the validators while maintaining the possibility
to validate the computations. In SMPC two or more users can collaborate to process even sensitive
personal data. Each user’s input is divided into shares, which are distributed randomly to other
participants. The users can see only their own result of the computation and receive only
meaningless shares of other participants inputs. 240
Confidential
transactions
Elements Project has developed a solution for keeping the actual amounts transacted visible only
to the individuals of the transaction while allowing validators to validate the transactions.241
Table of different technological solutions providing more privacy for individuals making
transactions in blockchain network.
The table briefly describes some of the most discussed technological solutions picked up by
legal scholars researching the issues of blockchain technology in relation to data protection.
More detailed analysis of the technological solutions goes far beyond the scope of this research.
Both legal and technological community seem to agree that different combinations of the
above-mentioned techniques could improve users’ privacy in traditional blockchains
remarkably. While many encouraging solutions have been presented, in most cases they are
computationally too impractical for widespread use at the moment. Buterin has well described
the situation by noting that there is no ‘magic bullet’ for privacy in blockchains, but instead
developers should focus on ‘partial solutions for specific use cases’.242 In order to help
developers to build privacy-enhancing solutions for different blockchain use cases, legal
certainty in respect to the acceptable level of anonymisation is required. As long as the legal
uncertainty prevails, it is hard to assess whether any of the current or proposed solutions suffice
for anonymising transactional data or metadata (public keys). In any case, the high standard for
anonymisation set out by Article 29 Working Party is likely to result in many cases for
blockchain-based applications to trigger the application of the GDPR.
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4.4 Allocation of responsibilities on blockchain networks
4.4.1 Main users of personal data under the GDPR
Primarily the GDPR only codified already existing roles and practices of different participants
in data processing activities. In general, a data controller is still the most important role because
a data controller has the main responsibility for complying with different obligations of the
regulation and for ensuring that data subjects’ rights are protected. However, the GDPR
assigned more responsibilities also to data processors, who must comply with many of the
requirements that apply to data controllers.243 A data controller is defined in the regulation as
the one who determines the purposes and the means of the processing of personal data.244
Article 29 Working Party has provided some guidance on how to interpret the notion of
‘purposes and means of processing’. In its opinion it concluded that while determining the
purposes (why data is processed) is solely reserved for data controllers, the determination of
certain technical and organisational elements related to the means of processing could be
delegated to data processors. However, most substantial questions such as ‘which data shall be
processed’ and ‘who shall have access to them’ are still reserved for controllers.245 The legal
form is not decisive in determining a responsible data controller because a data controller may
be a natural or a legal person or any other entity.246 In situations where the determination should
be made between an individual, such as an employee, and a company or government agency,
Article 29 Working Party has emphasised that the company or agency should be considered as
a data controller rather than an individual employee because entities are in better place to
exercise data subjects’ rights.247 In any case, determining who should be a data controller
requires careful attention to the factual circumstances of the case.248
Determination between a data controller and a data processor can be difficult especially when
there are several participants in the data processing activities. The main difference between the
243 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 101.
244 GDPR Article 4(7).
245 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor”’
(2010) WP169 15.
246 GDPR Article 4(7).
247 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor”’
(n 245) 15.
248 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
Protection Supervisor (n 66) 102.
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roles is that data controllers define the means and purposes of processing whereas data
processors process data on behalf of data controllers.249 Thus, there is a relationship between
data controllers and processors in which data processors are acting under the control of a data
controller. The GDPR requires that data controller and data processors enter into a binding
contract, which defines ‘the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and
purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the
obligations and rights of the controller’.250
The GDPR also recognises situations where two or more controllers process personal data for
a shared purpose and jointly determine the purposes and means of processing. Joint controllers
shall allocate their responsibilities for compliance with the GDPR in a transparent manner,
preferably in written form.251 Article 29 Working Party has emphasised a flexible interpretation
which could cover increasingly complex data processing scenarios. According to the opinion,
joint controllership does not necessarily require an equal participation and different controllers
may have different roles in the processing.252 Further, in complex data processing scenarios,
special attention should be paid to allocate responsibilities in a clear and transparent manner.253
4.4.2 Accountability gap and enforcement issues on traditional blockchains
The core nature of traditional blockchain technologies relies on distributed ledgers and peer-to-
peer networks, which is in a total contradiction with the underlying assumption of the GDPR
that personal data are stored on centralised data silos under the control of a specific central
intermediary. Due to this fundamental problem, it is difficult to allocate data protection
responsibilities to different participants on blockchain networks. Here, it is worth remembering
that even among traditional blockchains there are different ways to use the blockchain
technology for transacting. When the blockchain technology is used for direct transactions
between individuals, such as in the case of Bitcoin, the participants are not the same as to when
249 Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - Council of Europe-European Court of Human Rights - European Data
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blockchain technology is used as a backend for decentralised applications.254 Therefore,
determination of the respective data protection responsibilities on blockchain networks should
be done on a case-by-case basis considering the actual roles and functions of each participant.255
On blockchain networks, there are several participants including nodes, miners, developers,
application providers, and other service providers. Legal scholars have presented different ideas
for allocating responsibilities on blockchain networks. Much attention has been paid to whether
nodes, which are computers through which users connect to a blockchain network, qualify as
data controllers or processors. Berberich and Steiner have considered that there are two options;
either no node qualifies as a data controller or every node qualifies as a data controller.256
Another way to look at the issue is to consider all nodes together as joint data controllers. The
third and more extreme option would be to consider data subjects also as data controllers. Some
have also presented an idea that nodes and miners should rather be considered as infrastructure
than responsible participants in data processing activities.257 All of the options are discussed in
more detail below.
The difficulty to determine who is a responsible data controller undermines the principle of
accountability, one of the main principles of the GDRP. Berberich and Steiner have described
this issue as an ‘accountability gap’, where the exercise of data subjects’ rights, compliance
with data protection principles and obligations, and enforced sanctions could lose their
effectiveness.258 In addition to the difficulties in determining a responsible data controller,
perhaps even more difficult issue may arise in relation to enforcement. It is hard to define the
exact number, identity, and location of nodes considering the pseudonymous and supranational
nature of blockchain networks.259 What is more, due to the supranational nature of blockchain
networks and the extraterritorial scope of the GDPR, the regulation is likely to catch even data
controllers that are established outside of Europe but have some connection to data subjects in
the Union.260 If nodes were to qualify as data controllers or joint controllers, data subjects could
254 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 9-10.
255 Valeria Ferrari, ‘EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum Workshop on GDPR , Data Policy and Compliance’
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claim their rights against each node independently, which is not technically feasible. Individual
nodes are unable to respond to the tasks the GDPR sets out for data controllers because in many
cases the data stored in blockchains is either encrypted or hashed and the immutable ledger
makes it practically impossible for an individual node to modify data on blocks. In a such case,
nodes would most likely violate the provisions of the GDPR and would have to face hefty fines.
It could be contested whether that would be proportionate considering the passive role of the
nodes in data processing.261 In case nodes qualify as data processors instead of controllers, there
would still be difficulties considering that data controllers (data subjects or application
providers) would need to conclude data processing contracts with each node, and in case the
nodes violate their obligations, same type of enforcement difficulties may arise even if data
controllers carry the overall responsibilities.262 In light of the aforementioned, it is clear that
enforcing compliance with the GDPR would be extremely difficult in such circumstances.
4.4.3 Allocation of responsibilities on traditional blockchains
Legal scholars have presented various ideas for allocation of responsibilities on blockchain
networks. Berberich and Steiner have presented the idea that either no node qualifies as a data
controller because there is no individual control over the distributed ledger or every node
qualifies as a data controller because technically each node process copies of the ledger.
Without giving preference to either option, they simply state that ‘both outcomes hardly bring
meaningful results’.263 Finck has considered that more likely outcome is that every node
qualifies as a data controller because they independently pursue their objectives, decide whether
to join the blockchain network or not, and decide the means and purposes of the processing.
Determining that each node qualify as a data controller will lead to serious enforcement
difficulties as explained above. Further, it seems to lead to a disproportionate situation where
each node could face heavy sanctions for not complying with the obligations of the GDPR while
Union. Extraterritoriality has been criticised by legal scholars because it risks of being a ‘paper tiger’ as the EU
has no power to execute provisions of the GDPR outside the Union. In the context of blockchain, the situation is
even more complex and problematic if nodes are considered as data controllers or joint controllers because nodes
may be located all around the globe. Salmon and Maxwell (n 154) 11. On the extraterritorial scope of application
see n 98.
261 Finck (n 13) 17-18.
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those nodes do not have real possibilities to comply with the obligations.264 Salmensuu has
proposed an interpretation according to which nodes could be excluded from the liability due
to their ‘mere technical, automatic and passive nature of data processing’.265
Another way to look at the data controller issue is to consider all nodes on blockchain network
as joint controllers. There has been a debate among legal scholars whether nodes could qualify
as joint controllers. The debate has concerned whether nodes are jointly determining the means
and purposes of processing. Finck, Berberich and Steiner have argued that nodes do not meet
with the standards set out for joint controllers because there is no transparent and clear
allocation of responsibilities, but instead the system is ‘shaped by the nodes’ individual
behaviour’.266 On the other hand, Ibáñez, O’Hara and Samperl have considered in their research
that public and permissionless blockchains are ‘closer to a scheme where all participants are
potential joint-controllers’.267 Similarly, Wirth and Kolain have questioned the necessity of
‘intention to agree’ and argued that there is strong case for considering that joint controllership
applies to blockchain networks because nodes in the network are equal participants of the
network, free to choose whether to join or not, and capable of changing the rules if majority of
the nodes agree. However, Wirth and Kolain continue that if nodes are to be considered as joint
controllers, blockchain developers would have to design a layer of liability on top of blockchain
applications to allocate responsibilities between nodes in a clear and transparent agreement,
which could severely diminish the attractiveness of the blockchain applications.268
Legal scholars have presented also the idea that data subjects could qualify as data controllers
under certain circumstances. Salmon and Maxwell have compared blockchain networks to
cloud computing systems, where the cloud systems are considered as data processors while the
users downloading the files on the cloud are data controllers. On blockchain networks, in the
absence of centralised intermediary, the users could be considered as data controllers for
264 Finck (n 13) 17.
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themselves and data processors for others.269 Moreover, it is possible to build on top of
traditional blockchain applications sophisticated access authentication systems, which could
give individuals true control over their personal data. Users can decide to whom they give
access to their personal data and disable the access to the data anytime.270 In such scenarios, the
means of processing could be determined by the blockchain-based application while it is up to
the end-user to determine the purposes of processing.271 De Filippi has considered that in
decentralised data systems the ‘responsibility of keeping data private’ shifts from centralised
intermediaries to individuals.272 Such approach seems prima facie to be in line with the
objective of giving individuals more control over their personal data. However, Salmensuu has
criticised the approach because it presumes that data subjects are well-informed not only of
their rights as data subjects but also of the different technologies used to process personal
data.273 Accepting data subjects as data controllers in the context of traditional blockchains
would likely require educating data subjects of the risks related to the processing of personal
data on ‘immutable’ blockchains. Further, it would require a flexible approach, which approves
alternative means to achieve objectives of the GDPR, to the allocation of responsibilities.274
Ibáñez, O’Hara and Samperl have presented in their research two practical scenarios for
traditional blockchains. Firstly, traditional blockchains can be used by individuals to interact
directly with blockchain, for instance, when individuals exchange cryptocurrencies without a
centralised intermediary. In such a situation, the authors consider that it is impossible to find an
accountable data controller. Thus, the responsibility for compliance should be shifted to the
end-users by requiring them to sign terms of use.275 In the second scenario, traditional
blockchains are used as a backend for applications or platforms (smart contract platforms). The
most obvious interpretation would be to consider the application providers as data controllers
because they determine what personal data is collected and how the data is processed on a
blockchain.276 Other participants such as nodes, miners, online wallet operators, and other
269 Salmon and Maxwell (n 7) 10.
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service providers would qualify as data processors.277 While this scenario seems prima facie
much easier to carry out, it also comes with some impracticalities. The GDPR requires a data
controller to enter into data processing contract with every data processor it is using.278 This
would mean that data processing contracts would have to be concluded with every node or
miner of the blockchain network, which could be extremely challenging. Eichler and others
have argued that these issues illustrate why nodes and miners should rather be considered as
infrastructure than actual users of personal data in all circumstances.279
Above described different scenarios give a brief illustration of how problematic the allocation
of responsibilities and enforcement of data protection obligations can be on traditional
blockchains. Considering that accountability and enforcement of the obligations are crucial for
a proper functioning of the GDPR, these issues deserve more attention and research. The EDPS
has recognised the importance of the difficulties and recommended experts to look at the
issue.280 Without considering what would be the most likely regulatory approach for allocating
responsibilities on traditional blockchains, this research settles at this point for stating that such
determination is not an easy task. As legal scholars have acknowledged, the determination
should be done on a case-by-case basis considering the actual roles and functions of different
participants in every individual case.281
5 The conflict between the right to erasure under the GDPR and
the immutability of traditional blockchains
5.1 History and scope of the right to erasure
5.1.1 History of the right to erasure
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The need for the right to be forgotten or the right to erasure arises from the rapid development
of data analysis techniques and reduced data storage costs. In the past, information was
forgotten by default because there were no efficient ways to search and process data and storing
data was more expensive. Today, in the digital age a data is remembered by default and
individuals cannot be truly forgotten in online. Due to this development, individuals have
neither control over their data nor their identities online. In such a world, there seems to be a
need for the right to be forgotten in order to give individuals more control over their data and
identities.282 In spite of that, the right received a lot of criticism during the legislative process
of the GDPR. Understanding the actual scope of the right helps to exercise the right properly
and to avoid some common misconceptions relating to its extent.
Instead of a being entirely new right, the right to erasure, more commonly known as the right
to be forgotten, has developed progressively over the years. Some instances of the right were
already present in different national data protection laws drafted before the DPD, which entered
into force in 1995.283 The DPD does not contain a separate right to erasure or a right to be
forgotten, but certain provisions of the DPD can be regarded as a seed for the right to erasure
as it appears under Article 17 of the GDPR. Article 12(b) of the DPD gave data subjects the
right to obtain rectification, erasure or blocking of data particularly if the data was incomplete
or inaccurate. Article 12(c) in turn provided obligation for a data controller to inform third
parties of the request to erase data, when the request was carried out in compliance with Article
12(b). Furthermore, Article 14 of the DPD provided data subjects with a right to object to the
processing of personal data under certain conditions.284 These rights have been considered as
‘diluted right to be forgotten provisions’.285
The European Commission published its Communication in 2010 in which it acknowledged
that the right to be forgotten should be clarified to strengthen individuals’ control over their
personal data.286 The Communication was a starting point for a legal debate of the right to be
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forgotten. In 2012, the Commission published the draft version of the GDPR, which contained
an ambitious wording of the right to erasure. The extraterritorial scope of application of the
GDPR also attracted the attention of the United States (US) legal scholars, who harshly
criticised the right to be forgotten. 287 The criticism focused especially on the potential conflicts
between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of speech, on the difficulties in enforcing the
right, and on the ambiguity of the terms erasure and forgetting.288 In the US, the freedom of
speech is typically interpreted widely and often at the expense of the privacy and data
protection. Against that background, it is unsurprising that the right to be forgotten was seen as
an excessive threat to the freedom of speech. In the Union, the right to data protection, by
contrast, is recognised as a fundamental right that should be equally balanced with other
fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech. This and other underlying differences on
the approach to data protection between the US and the EU explains the strong reaction to the
right to be forgotten.289
The right to be forgotten was also criticised for the burden it places on data subjects. According
to the critics, the right to be forgotten presumes that individuals know what personal data of
them are processed and who is the responsible data controller. However, this is rarely the case
in the era of big data. These difficulties of exercising the right could reduce the efficiency of
the right.290 Further, the right to be forgotten was criticised for the ambiguity of the term
‘forgotten’. The term forget implies that data subjects have an actual right to have any
information on them permanently erased from the web. However, such a right would be in a
collision with the freedom of speech and not practically feasible considering that it is extremely
difficult to be sure whether information that has once been published online exist somewhere
even if the controller has erased the data.291 Search engines further challenge the concept of
web’s forgetfulness by providing tools for anyone to find information that could be otherwise
buried on the web and forgotten.292 Nevertheless, Article 17 of the GDPR does not provide a
right to be genuinely forgotten on the web, even though it is a significant step towards such a
right. It has been argued that Article 17 should not contain the label right to be forgotten at all
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because the term may be misleading.293 On the one hand, the label might undermine the actual
content of the right by implying that the right is available only if data is outdated. On the other
hand, it might mislead data subjects to believe that they have a right to get rid of their online
history and to be de facto forgotten.294
The next significant landmark on the development of the right to be forgotten was the Google
Spain decision given in 2014.295 In the case, a Spanish citizen lodged a complaint against a
Spanish newspaper and the Google Spain. The claimant demanded that information concerning
real-estate auction notice of his repossessed home would not appear on the Google’s search
results because the proceedings were resolved years ago and the reference to them was no
longer relevant. The claimant requested the newspaper to delete certain web pages and the
Google Spain to remove his personal data so that the search results would no longer display
such personal information.296 The Court ruled that search engines can be data controllers under
the DPD and data subjects have a right to request search engines to remove links to web pages
containing personal data of them if the data is no longer necessary for the initial purposes,
especially when the data has become inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive.297
Furthermore, the Court found that the right is not absolute because it must always be balanced
against other fundamental rights including the right to free expression.298
The case raised another legal debate regarding the right to be forgotten. The Commission argued
that even though the ruling did not explicitly mention the right to be forgotten, the Court applied
implicitly existing right to be forgotten.299 This argument has been questioned by several legal
scholars, who have argued that the Court did not apply the right to be forgotten at all, but that
instead, the Court applied Articles 12(b) and 14 under the DPD.300 This was also expressed by
the Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen in his Opinion in the Google Spain in which he stated
that the DPD ‘does not provide a general right to be forgotten’.301 Regardless whether the Court
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applied an implicit right to be forgotten or not, it is obvious the ruling did not cover the right to
erasure to the extent it is under Article 17 of the GDPR.302
5.1.2 The right to erasure under Article 17 of the GDPR
Although the right to erasure is not an entirely new right per se, Article 17 provides more
detailed and precise right for data subjects to exercise. Article 17 is divided into three
paragraphs. According to the Article 17(1):
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal
data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to
erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:
The first paragraph, on the one hand, gives data subjects a right to obtain erasure, and on the
other hand, sets an obligation for data controllers to erase data without undue delay. The right
to erasure is not, however, an absolute right as it requires that at least one of the following six
grounds applies.
The first ground applies when personal data is no longer necessary for the purposes it was
initially or otherwise processed.303 This ground is in line with the principle of purpose
limitation. The second ground applies when data processing is based on the data subject’s
consent, and the data subject has decided to withdraw the consent. However, this ground does
not apply in case the data controller has other legal ground for the processing.304 Under the
DPD, there was no explicit right to withdraw consent, which was problematic considering that
a consent is the most common lawful basis for processing.305 The right to withdraw consent
under Article 7(3) of the GDPR combined with the right to request erasure when the consent is
withdrawn pursue to restore data subjects the control over their personal data even after they
have given their consent for the processing. As long as the scope of ‘other legal ground’
exception remains uncertain, the exception forms a risk for an effective exercise of the right to
erasure when withdrawing consent.306 The third ground is applicable when a data subject
302 Bartolini and Siry (n 284) 229.
303 GPDR Article 17(1)(a).
304 GPDR Article 17(1)(b).
305 Bartolini and Siry (n 284) 223.
306 Bartolini and Siry (n 284) 230.
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exercises the right to object pursuant to Article 21(1) unless a data controller has an overriding
legitimate ground for the processing. The exception of overriding legitimate ground does not
apply if the data subject objects processing for direct marketing purposes.307 Successful
objection to processing does not result in the erasure of the data, so it seems that data subject
should request the erasure separately alongside with the objection.308 The fourth ground applies
when data is processed unlawfully, for instance, when there is no legal ground for the
processing or the processing infringes data processing principles.309 The fifth ground applies
when data must be erased to comply with a legal obligation. The last ground applies when data
is collected and processed in the context of offering information society services to a child
younger than 16 years.310
The second paragraph contains another obligation for data controllers, which have made
personal data public and are obliged to erase the data pursuant to the first paragraph. According
to the Article 17(2):
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph
1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost
of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform
controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the
erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.
While the first paragraph sets an obligation for a data controller to delete data under certain
circumstances, the second paragraph goes further by embracing the right to be ‘forgotten’.311
In theory, a data subject could request each controller or third party individually to erase any
replications of the personal data. However, in cases where the initial controller has made the
personal data public, it is practically difficult to know who those other controllers are because
once information is published online, it is easy to replicate it.312 As a response to this practical
problem, Article 17(2) strengthens data subjects’ right to obtain erasure by obliging initial data
controllers to take reasonable steps to inform other controllers processing the data of the
request.313 In essence, data controllers are obliged to implement technical means for tracking
307 GDPR Article 17(1)(c).
308 Zanfir (n 283) 233.
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personal data.314 The second paragraph thus represents an attempt to provide data subjects with
a possibility to obtain complete erasure of their personal data – to be actually forgotten.
The right to be forgotten has been criticised for the fact that it sets an unreasonable burden on
data controllers because it is practically impossible to delete information permanently in an
online environment.315 Politou, Alepis and Patsakis have reviewed in their research several
state-of-art methods and architectures that seek to enable permanent erasure of widely
distributed data. They point out that there are interesting solutions for tracking data and helping
data controllers to comply with the obligation to inform other controllers.316 In the same vein,
Bartolini and Siry have noted that many actors have already implemented such solutions, and
that there is a growing trend to adopt such means.317
Moreover, in contrast to the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay, the
obligation to inform other controllers of the request is not a duty to achieve a specific result but
instead a duty of best effort. In other words, the data controller is not required to ensure that
other controllers remove links, copies or any replication of the personal data, but it is enough
that the data controller takes reasonable steps to inform them. Thus, the data controller is not
held liable even if it fails to inform other controllers, provided that it has taken reasonable steps
to inform.318 Regulators drafted deliberately quite a general obligation to inform and avoided
binding the provision to any specific technical means in order to prevent the provision becoming
outdated as a consequence of technological advances.319 It has been argued that the lack of
technical guidance on the right to be ‘forgotten’ might compromise the future enforcement of
the right.320
As already noted, the right to erasure is not an absolute right considering that it requires a
specific legal ground to apply. Secondly, the right to erasure under Article 17 contains a specific
list of limitations on the right. The third paragraph contains limitations which cover both the
obligation to erase data and the obligation to inform other controllers. The freedom of
314 Bartolini and Siry (n 284) 231.
315 Politou, Alepis and Patsakis (n 282) 12-13.
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expression and information is the most discussed limitation for the right to erasure. That is only
natural considering that when personal data is made public, the right to have one’s personal
data erased is often in conflict with the right of the general public to have access to that
information. The limitation aims to strike a balance between the data protection and the freedom
of expression. The Court recognised the exception already in the Google Spain case, where it
ruled the right to delisting not to be an absolute right because it must be balanced against other
fundamental rights, especially the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media.321 Other
limitations concern the compliance with legal obligations or performance of a public task, the
processing for public interest in the area of public health, the processing for historical,
statistical, and scientific purposes, and the processing for exercising legal claims. These
limitations provide necessary guidance of the actual scope of the right to erasure.322
5.1.3 The right to erasure and other provisions of the GDPR
Article 17 states under which conditions the right to erasure applies and what is the scope of
the right. However, a proper understanding of the right also requires attention to some other
important aspects of the right. Significant novelty concerning the exercise of the right is a
reversed burden of proof, which is in line with the new principle of accountability. Instead of
requiring a data subject to prove that the data is inaccurate or outdated and should be erased,
the GDPR provides data controllers to be able to prove that the data cannot be erased as it is
necessary for the processing. Moreover, the extraterritorial scope of application and significant
sanctions avoid circumventing the obligations and encourage companies to comply with the
right.323
In general, the right to erasure is an essential tool for improving individuals’ control over their
personal data and enhancing their right to data protection. Besides providing a separate right to
erasure, Article 17 can help to exercise other rights under the GDPR, such as the right to object
processing of personal data or the right to withdraw consent.324 The right to erasure has also a
connection to the right to the restriction of processing, which could be applied when processing
is unlawful but the data subject requests a restriction of the processing instead of an erasure of
321 European Commission, ‘Factsheet on the “ Right to Be Forgotten" ruling (C-131-12)’ (n 296).
322 GDPR Article 17(3)(b), (c), (d), and (e).
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the data.325 Moreover, Article 19 requires data controllers to notify any erasure carried out
pursuant to Article 17(1) to each recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed.
However, the data controller may derogate from this obligation if the obligations proves
impossible or requires a disproportionate effort.326
As discussed above, it has been contested whether the right to be forgotten existed implicitly
already in the DPD or not. Without delving deeper into that debate, it is evident that Article 17
provides much more detailed and specified right to erasure than ever seen before. The provision
specifies circumstances for exercising the right by introducing both legal grounds for its
application and limitations on the scope of it.327 This detailed definition of the right helps both
the data controllers and the data subjects to assess when the right can be exercised. The legal
grounds for the right extend the scope of the previously existed ‘diluted right to be forgotten
provisions’ under the DPD. The right to erasure is thus a very welcome right for enhancing
individuals’ data protection in the digital age. Despite both the right to erasure and the GDPR
itself were adopted as a response to the challenges stemming from advanced data analysis
techniques, it seems, that the regulation is already one step behind technology.
5.2 Reconciling the conflict between the immutability and the right to erasure
5.2.1 What is the conflict about?
The previous chapter presented the actual scope of the right to erasure under the GDPR. With
that presentation in mind, it is time to move forward to delve into the issues stemming from the
immutability of traditional blockchains. The immutability is a core feature of blockchain
technologies that allows affirming the integrity of the ledger without having to trust on third
parties.328 In traditional blockchains, data is stored on blocks. Only new blocks can be added to
the chain, and each new block is connected to the previous block through a hash function. The
blocks form a distributed chronological ledger.329 Each node holds only copy of the ledger.
Technically, a local copy of the ledger could be modified, but the modified ledger would not be
325 GDPR Article 18(1)(b).
326 GDPR Article 19.
327 Markou (n 11) 210.
328 Finck (n 13) 4.
329 Salmon and Maxwell (n 7) 6.
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approved by other nodes. Modifying data on old blocks invalidates the blockchain as even a
slight modification of the block’s data creates a different hash for the block, and the hash would
no longer correspond with the hash stored on the next block.330 In traditional blockchains,
modifying or erasing data on old blocks would require to unbuild the blockchain, modify or
erase the data on the block, and then rebuild the unbuild part of the blockchain again. 331 Another
way would be to build a new chain containing the modifications. The modifications would
require a majority of the nodes to agree (consensus), which can be extremely difficult to
accomplish in a decentralised peer-to-peer network.332
Traditional blockchains are decentralised peer-to-peer networks in which achieving consensus
to modify data on old blocks is extremely challenging due to the large number of unrelated and
pseudonymous participants. Nevertheless, true immutability does not exist on Bitcoin or
Ethereum currently because old data could be modified, and the modifications could be
validated if the majority of the nodes agreed. Essentially, Bitcoin and Ethereum trust on the
majority of the network instead of centralised intermediaries.333 Bitcoin and Ethereum are
currently based on PoW consensus algorithm in which miners create blocks.334 It would be very
expensive but not impossible for a centralised mining pool or a government to install more
mining power than the rest of the network and to achieve control over the blockchain.335 The
DAO hack was an illustrating real-life example how blockchains are not truly immutable.336
While traditional blockchains are not genuinely immutable because the ledger could be
modified and validated by the majority, traditional blockchains are still incredibly tamper-
resistant and nearly immutable ledgers.
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It should be noticed that the conflict between the right to erasure and the immutability is tightly
connected to the question about personal data and anonymisation and the question about
allocation of responsibilities on traditional blockchains, which were discussed in Chapter 4.3
and 4.4 in more detail. Firstly, anonymisation techniques are the most obvious and effective
solution for the conflict. If transactional data and public keys could be anonymised, the GDPR
would not apply, and there would be no need to consider how to comply with the right to erasure
at all. Secondly, the question about allocation of responsibilities on traditional blockchains is
crucial in determining who should comply with the obligation to erase and from whom the data
subjects could obtain the erasure. The allocation of responsibilities with regard to the right to
erasure is considered in Chapter 5.3.2.
The conflict between the immutability and the right to erasure has been recognised by some
legal scholars, who have reviewed possible solutions to the conflict. From a legal perspective,
the solutions are based on that the right to erasure is not an absolute right and the term erasure
is not defined in the GDPR. The right to erasure is not an absolute right considering that Article
17(3) lists five different limitations on the right to erasure. These exceptions are not, however,
of particular interest in relation to the immutability but could be relied on if a blockchain
application is used for such purposes.337 Moreover, data controllers are obliged to erase data
only if at least one of the six legal grounds for the erasure applies. The exact meaning of the
term erasure is also uncertain. Therefore, it is possible to argue that erasure does not necessarily
refer to an outright deletion of the data, but instead, some alternative solutions could be used to
disable access to the data.338 In addition to the legal solutions, blockchain developers have
developed means to make it easier to erase data on old blocks. All these solutions are analysed
in detail in Chapter 5.2.3.
The right to erasure covers two obligations for data controllers. The obligation to erase personal
data without undue delay if certain conditions are met seems to be prima facie in total conflict
with the immutability of traditional blockchains because erasing data on blocks is extremely
difficult. The second obligation requires a data controller to inform other controllers of the
request to erase any links, copies, or replications of the personal data if the personal data is
made public and if there is an obligation to erase pursuant to Article 17(1). While the conflict
337 Finck (n 13) 23.
338 Finck (n 13) 25.
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between the immutability and the obligation to erase is the primary focus of this research, it is
worth also analysing the second obligation with respect to traditional blockchains.
5.2.2 Obligation to inform other controllers of the request to erase in traditional blockchains
The second obligation requires data controllers if they have made the personal data public to
take reasonable steps to inform other controllers that data subject has requested erasure. This
second obligation attempts to guarantee data subjects the right to be ‘forgotten’ by requiring
the initial controller to implement technical means to track the movement of personal data in
order keep up with who has replicated the data. While the obligation to erase has attracted a lot
of attention in the blockchain community, the obligation to inform other controllers has been
overlooked.  The GDPR allows taking account of available technology and the cost of
implementation when assessing the reasonable steps to inform, which could provide room for
a flexible interpretation that considers the technical difficulties of complying with the obligation
in a blockchain environment. Due to the abstract wording of Article 17(2), it is uncertain how
the obligation will be enforced in practice.339 On traditional blockchain networks, transactions
are not only distributed to all nodes on the network but are also available for anyone to review
online. Thus, it seems that the data in the transactions and the public keys are made public on
blockchains.
Neisse, Steri and Nai-Fovino have presented in their research two data accountability and
provenance tracking solutions build on Ethereum platform, which could enable data subjects
(users) to track data controllers and processors to whom the data subjects have given access to
their personal data.340 These solutions could be interesting in relation to the obligation to inform
other controllers because they enable means for tracking bounces of data on traditional
blockchains. Access authorisation solutions implemented on blockchain applications could
provide users with technical means to keep track of data controllers and processors to whom
the user has directly or indirectly given access to the data.341 As discussed in Chapter 4.4.3, it
is possible to argue that on traditional blockchain networks users are both data subjects and data
controllers at the same time. The user (data controller) could keep track of the data that he or
339 Politou, Alepis and Patsakis (n 282) 11.
340 Neisse, Steri and Nai-Fovino (n 133).
341 Neisse, Steri and Nai-Fovino (n 133) 1.
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she is willing to share with other data controllers and processors. However, it seems that the
problem exists in relation to the public keys. The user would not be able to keep track of the
data controllers accessing the public keys from publicly available transaction history.
Regarding the obligation to inform data controllers of the request to erase any links, copies or
replications of the personal data, it could be argued that the technical means to track bounces
of the data could not be implemented by reasonable means on traditional blockchain
applications. Another way to comply with Article 17(2) would be the anonymisation of public
keys. As discussed in Chapter 4.4.3, it is uncertain whether public keys could be anonymised
with state-of-art anonymisation techniques or with advanced anonymisation techniques in the
future. A flexible interpretation that would reconsider the high threshold for anonymisation set
out by Article 29 Working Party could enable the anonymisation of public keys on traditional
blockchains.
5.2.3 Solutions proposed for reconciling the conflict between the right to erasure and  the
immutability of traditional blockchains
Interpretations of the legal grounds under Article 17(1)
Some legal scholars have noted that solution for the conflict between the right to erasure and
the immutability of traditional blockchains could be found on the legal grounds upon which the
right to erasure applies. Berberich and Steiner have claimed that it is not unthinkable that the
‘core functioning principle of technology’ could serve as a basis to refuse to accommodate a
request to erase data from a blockchain.342 Article 17(1)(a) provides a data subject with the right
to obtain erasure if the personal data are no longer necessary for the purposes they were
collected or otherwise processed. Berberich and Steiner have argued that it is conceivable that
in the context of blockchain personal data are considered as necessary for the processing
purposes because a perpetual and immutable storage is a necessity for the proper functioning
of the blockchain.343 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl have similarly pointed out that it is possible
to consider that the perpetual processing is always necessary for processing the data for the
purposes they have been collected or otherwise processed. They use a land registry as an
example to illustrate that the perpetual processing may be the precise reason for relying on
342 Berberich and Steiner (n 48) 426.
343 Berberich and Steiner (n 48) 426.
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blockchain technology.344 While this might provide a counter-argument for refusing to comply
with a data subject’s request in a particular case, it does not exclude traditional blockchain
technologies in general from the obligation to erase data because the data subject may still rely
on other applicable legal grounds under Article 17.
Another interesting legal ground that entitles data subjects to request erasure applies when the
processing has been based on a data subject’s consent, and the data subject has later withdrawn
the consent. However, this ground is not unconditional because it does not apply if there is some
other legal ground for the processing. The scope of the ‘other legal ground’ exception is
uncertain and will depend on future interpretations of the Court. The exception seems to refer
to the lawful bases for processing listed in Article 6 of the GDPR.345 Berberich and Steiner have
pondered whether the core functioning principle of technology could serve as other legal ground
under Article 17(1)(b).346 Considering the lawful bases set out in Article 6, the performance of
a contract and the legitimate interest of a controller or third party appear to be the most suitable
ones for the core functioning principle of technology.347 The perpetual processing of personal
data could be regarded as necessary for the performance of the contract when a data subject has
entered into a contract that is performed by using a blockchain technology or stored in a
blockchain. The problem with this option is that the data subject may terminate the contract,
and after the termination, the data should be erased by a request.348
Another option would be to consider the core functioning principle of technology under the
legitimate interest of a controller or third party. That would require carrying out a balancing
exercise between the interests of the data controller or third parties and the interest and
fundamental rights of the data subject as detailed below. Recital 47 of the GDPR states that
when assessing the legitimate interest of the controller, attention should be paid to the
relationship between the data subject and the controller and to the reasonable expectations of
the data subject concerning whether further processing takes place on such circumstances. Thus,
it is recommendable to inform the data subject in a transparent manner that he or she can neither
exercise the right to withdraw consent nor the right to obtain erasure on the basis of withdrawing
344 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 4.
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consent. This informing could be done by using terms of service by which the user gives consent
for the processing and knowingly waive the right to obtain erasure on the basis of Article
17(1)(b).349 In practice, data subjects would have to give their consent in perpetuity
acknowledging that the consent can no longer be efficiently withdrawn.350 Such practise defeats
the new possibility to efficiently exercise the right to withdraw consent introduced by the
GDPR. It remains to be seen how data protection authorities or courts would respond to that.
The third legal ground for the erasure applies if data subject objects to the processing and there
are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing. A contrario, data controller could refuse
to comply with the request to erase if it can demonstrate an overriding legitimate ground for the
processing.351 Besides relying on the consent as a legal basis for the processing, traditional
blockchain applications could also rely on the legitimate interest of controllers or third parties
as a lawful basis for the processing.352 Traditional blockchains may be used for various use
cases, such as cryptocurrencies, decentralised identity management, decentralised job markets,
and so forth. Article 29 Working Party has noted that the concept of interest is rather broad
covering not only benefits of the controller but also benefits for society in general.353
Considering that traditional blockchains could enable new types of peer-to-peer applications
which are specially developed to benefit individual users, it is conceivable that traditional
blockchain applications could rely on the legitimate interest of third parties as a lawful basis
for the processing. Processing personal data on a transparent and immutable ledger could be
argued to pursue the legitimate interest of users because the processing is necessary to allow
users to verify the validity of the ledger without trusting on a centralised intermediary.354
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However, the availability of legitimate interest is not enough for the processing to be considered
lawful, but instead, Article 6(1)(f) provides that such interest must override the interests and
fundamental rights of the data subject. Legitimate interest is the only lawful basis that requires
further balancing between the interest of the controller and the interests and fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject to determine whether the basis applies. In general, the more
important and compelling the interests of the controller or third party are, the more far-reaching
impact the interest may have on the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject.355
Berberich and Steiner have pointed out regarding the balancing test between policy interests
and fundamental rights that the German Constitutional Court has recognised a ‘right in the
confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems’ as a constitutional right. While
it is not recognised as a fundamental right in the EU level, this shows that acknowledging the
core functioning principle of technology under the legitimate interest of third parties is not a
purely hypothetical scenario.356
In the balancing test, different additional safeguards which could ‘prevent undue impact on data
subjects’ have a special role as one of the three key factors that should be considered when
carrying out the balancing exercise.357 Such additional safeguards include, inter alia, the use of
anonymisation techniques such as encryption and pseudonymisation.358 According to the
opinion, important legitimate interests of the controller combined with additional safeguards
could justify even a significant infringement or impact on data subjects’ interests and
fundamental rights.359 On the one hand, blockchain applications often rely on pseudonymisation
and encryption which could, if combined with the interest of the users, justify even a significant
impact on the data subjects. On the other hand, the processing of personal data on blockchains
would have a substantial impact on the data subjects’ fundamental rights considering that the
data subjects could not necessarily exercise their right to erasure. In any case, if blockchain
technology is to be used for the processing of personal data by relying on the legitimate interest
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of third parties as a lawful basis, the balancing test should be carried out to determine whether
the legitimate interests of third parties override the interests and fundamental rights of the data
subject in a particular case.
The GDPR provides data subjects with the right to contest the legitimate interest of a data
controller under Article 21. According to Article 21, a data subject has the right to object to the
processing of his or her personal data on grounds relating to his or her particular situation.
Contrary to the DPD, Article 21 of the GDPR contains a reversed burden of proof. A data
controller must be able to demonstrate that it has a compelling legitimate ground for the
processing which overrides the interests and rights of the data subject.360 The exercise of the
right to object to the processing requires a similar balancing test than with Article 6(1)(f).
However, Article 21(1) sets out an additional requirement, i.e., the legitimate ground must be
compelling. The GDPR does not entail any definition of the compelling legitimate ground.
Article 29 Working Party has considered regarding profiling that the legitimate ground might
be compelling when the processing (profiling in that case) is beneficial for society at large (or
a broader community) and not just for the business interest of the controller.361 Again,
considering the potential of blockchain technology to boost new types of peer-to-peer
applications, it could be argued that the processing of personal data in a particular blockchain
application may be beneficial to such ‘broader community’.
If a data controller cannot demonstrate a compelling legitimate ground for the processing, the
processing must be interrupted.362 According to Article 17(1)(c), a data subject has the right to
request erasure of the data if he or she objects pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing. Article 17(1)(c) does not explicitly require
compelling legitimate grounds, but it seems that exercising the right to erasure on the basis of
the objection requires a successful objection under Article 21.363 In order to lawfully refuse to
accommodate with a data subject’s request to erase data, a data controller should be able to
demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds. Therefore, it could be argued that to process
360 GDPR Article 21(1).
361 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling
for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (2016) WP251 25.
362 GDPR Article 21(1).
363 Jef Ausloos, ‘The Interaction between the Rights to Object and to Erasure in the GDPR’ (KU Leuven Data
Protection and Privacy Blog, 25 August 2016) <www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/gdpr-update-the-interaction-
between-the-right-to-object-and-the-right-to-erasure/> accessed 3 September 2018.
67
personal data on blockchain data controller should be able to demonstrate compelling legitimate
grounds, which override the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject if no other
solution for the conflict between immutability and the right to erasure is available.
Nonetheless, even if the controller could demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds for the
processing, that does not exempt the data controller from complying with data protection
principles listed in Article 5.364  Lawful processing of personal data requires not only lawful
basis for the processing but also the data protection principles to be respected.365 Article
17(1)(d) gives to a data subject a legal ground to obtain erasure if personal data have been
processed unlawfully. It is for the data controller to prove that the processing of personal data
has been lawful.366 Blockchain technologies, however, are not necessarily in line with some of
the data protection principles. The immutability of blockchains, the perpetual storage of data,
and the difficulties in determining a responsible data controller might collide with the principles
of data minimisation, storage limitation, and accountability.367 Unfortunately, the scope of this
research does not allow a more detailed examination of these issues. In any case, if the
processing of personal data by particular blockchain application is considered unlawful because
it is incompatible with some of the data protection principles, the data subject has a right to
obtain erasure even if the data controller could demonstrate a compelling and overriding
legitimate interest for the processing.
Above described interpretations of the legal grounds for erasure could provide room for
refusing to accommodate data subject’s request. However, it may well be contested whether
these practices would be acceptable from the data subject’s perspective. Data subjects should,
at least, be educated about the risks related to the processing of personal on traditional
blockchains. Even though traditional blockchains rely on encryption and pseudonymisation, an
immutable and permanent database is a dangerous combination considering that even a high
level of state-of-art encryption could be broken in the future, for instance, by quantum
computers.368 To sum up, the analysis of the legal grounds for erasure proved that it is important
364 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of Legitimate Interests of the Data
Controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC’ (n 353) 11.
365 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 185.
366 GDPR Article 5(2).
367 More on the issues between blockchain technology and the data protection principles see eg Filippone (n 2) 31-
34.
368 Eichler and others (n 190) 4.
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to consider the conflict between the right to erasure and immutability already when determining
the lawful basis for the processing because the choice of a lawful basis could also affect to the
obligation to erase in the future.
The technological solution proposed for the conflict
In addition to the above-mentioned legal solutions for reconciling the conflict between the right
to erasure and the immutability of traditional blockchains, legal scholars have recognised the
possibility to use a specific technological solution to help complying with the obligation to
erase in the context of blockchain.369 The promising technological solution is known as
chameleon-hashes. The chameleon-hashes enable to give either to trusted third parties or
several distrustful parties the capability to modify or erase data on old blocks without having to
unbuild the whole blockchain before the modification. Ateniese and others have presented in
their research the concept of redactable blockchain based on special chameleon-hashes which
could be rather easily implemented to any traditional blockchains without a considerable
computational overhead.370 The chameleon-hashes differ from standard hashes used on
blockchains as they include a ‘digital trapdoor’ that allows those who know the secret trapdoor
key to modify or erase transactional data on an old block without invalidating the chain.371 Once
data on the old block is modified or erased, the new special blockchain is distributed to all other
nodes on the network, who should then replace other versions of the blockchain with it.372
The redactable blockchains could offer particularly interesting solutions for the right to erasure
because they allow giving the possibility to redact data on blocks for trusted third parties
without compromising the operation of the blockchain. The blockchain itself would still run on
the chosen consensus algorithm and transactions would be verified as usual. In such situations,
the power to redact data on blockchains could be given to trusted third parties, such as
arbitrators or data protection authorities. The ability to edit data on blocks could be reserved to
trusted third parties, and for the ‘bad actors’, the blockchain would remain immutable.373 If
application providers would be considered as data controllers on traditional blockchains, the
369 See eg Finck (n 13) 24; Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
370 Ateniese and others (n 333).
371 Ateniese and others provide a proof-of-concept implementation of their redactable blockchain by implementing
it on top of Bitcoin core. They represent how the integrity of the ledger could be maintained by using hash collision
algorithm so that the hash of the new message is the same as the original (erased or modified) message. Ateniese
and others (n 33) 124.
372 Ateniese and others (n 333) 118.
373 Ateniese and others (n 333) 113.
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possibility of redacting blockchain could be given to them. This way the data controller could
comply with the right to erasure in respect to transactional data. While this is a potential solution
for compliance with the right to erasure, it reintroduces the need for trusted third parties and
‘betrays the decentralisation principle’ of traditional blockchains.
Ateniese and others, however, have presented also a decentralised application of their
redactable blockchain in which the trapdoor key is either distributed to all full miners of the
network (for blockchains with small number of participants) or secretly shared to a fixed set of
chosen users, which could together modify or erase data on blocks by engaging in a multi-party
computation.374 As such, the possibility to edit data on old blocks could also be achieved in a
truly decentralised way.
Some legal scholars have reviewed the possibilities to use chameleon-hashes for complying
with the right to erasure on blockchains. Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl have taken quite an
optimistic view of the chameleon-hashes by considering that state-of-art blockchain
technologies must adopt chameleon-hashes.375 On the other hand, Finck has taken a more
critical approach to chameleon-hashes by pointing out that the chameleon-hashes come with
many drawbacks.376 Firstly, there is a risk that if the trapdoor key is lost, the blockchain will
turn immutable again.377 Further, this solution would still require other nodes to accept the
modified ‘special ledger’, which is a question that should be addressed in an application-
specific manner.378 Thirdly, the use of chameleon-hashes to erase data on old blocks does not
change the fact that old copies of the ledger, which contain the erased data, may still exist.379 It
should be reminded that the right to erasure does not contain de facto right to be forgotten on
the internet. Instead, data controllers are obliged to take reasonable steps to inform other
controllers that data subject has requested erasure of any links, copy or replication of the data.
The chameleon-hashes could provide an interesting solution for complying with the right to
erasure on traditional blockchains. Thus, it should be further examined and explored how the
374 Ateniese and others (n 333) 120.
375 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
376 Finck (n 13) 24.
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chameleon-hashes could be applied in practice to comply with the right to erasure. For instance,
how the secret set of users, who can by collaborating modify old blocks, could together assess
whether there is a legal ground for the right to erasure or whether the limitations of Article 17(3)
would apply in a particular case? The redactable blockchains further presume that the redactions
would not be carried out often, but instead only under exceptional circumstances, for instance,
when inappropriate content containing child pornography or equivalent material is stored in the
blockchain.380 Many blockchain applications, however, process personal data on a constant
basis (even though data might be hashed or encrypted). Data subjects have the right to request
erasure of their personal data whenever their personal data is processed on a blockchain as long
as there is a legal ground for the request. In such situations, the erasure might not be as
exceptional measure as envisioned. In any case, the chameleon-hashes are an interesting
technological solution that is worth examining in more detail with regard to compliance with
the right to erasure.
Alternative interpretations of the erasure
Article 17 does not provide any explanation of the term ‘erasure’. Legal scholars have argued
that it is conceivable that erasure could be interpreted to mean something else than an outright
deletion of data.381 The ruling on the Google Spain case, although not concerning the right to
erasure under the GDPR, seems to support a flexible interpretation. Instead of requiring deletion
of the original data, the Court only required erasure of the links to the data from search results
(delisting). Thus, the Court considered that reducing accessibility to the data by delisting could
achieve the desired result.382 On the other hand, the ruling on the Nowak case could imply a
direction to a stricter interpretation of the erasure. In the Nowak case, the Court ruled on the
right to obtain erasure under Article 12(b) of the DPD. The Court considered that the data
subject had a right to have his school examination script ‘erased, that is to say, destroyed’.383
Despite the rulings, the exact meaning of the erasure remains uncertain, and there is still room
for alternative interpretations under the GDPR. Moreover, while the GDPR is directly
applicable in all Member States, the Member States may have some margin of discretion.384
380 Ateniese and others (n 333) 112.
381 Finck (n 13) 24.
382 Ludo Gorzeman and Paulan Korenhof, ‘Escaping the Panopticon Over Time: Balancing the Right To Be
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The German national data protection law contains a ‘softer version’ of the right to erasure,
however, in relation to non-automated data processing.385 While it remains to be seen whether
it is considered to be in accordance with Article 17, it shows that alternative interpretations,
which take into account the technical infeasibilities arising from the mode of storage, could be
introduced.386
As an alternative solution to the outright deletion, some legal scholars have considered the
possibility to use sufficiently strong encryption to obscure the data stored in blockchains, and
then destroy the decryption key. In such a situation, the encrypted data would still exist on
the blockchain, but the data could no longer be decrypted with the private key.387 As in the
Google Spain ruling, the data on the storage (here blockchain) would not be deleted, but access
to the data is made infeasible.
The adequacy of the solution depends on what constitutes a sufficient level of encryption under
the GDPR.388 As discussed in Chapter 4.3, this question remains uncertain. For the time being,
only guidance on the matter is the Article 29 Working Party Opinion on the anonymisation
techniques from 2014. According to the opinion, an encryption cannot prevent identification of
a data subject because the encrypted data could be restored to the original form, for instance,
‘by applying the algorithm in the opposite way, or by brute force attacks, depending on the
nature of the schemes, or as a result of a data breach’.389 As Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl have
noted, the opinion emphasises the existence of the decryption key and original data, ‘(f)or as
long as the key or the original data are available (even in the case of a trusted third party,
contractually bound to provide secure key escrow service), the possibility to identify a data
subject is not eliminated’. Regarding the proposed solution, it would no longer be possible to
decrypt the encrypted data with a private key, but the risk of brute force attacks still exists.390
The important question here is whether a data subject could be directly or indirectly identified
from his or her public key by using a brute force attack. As discussed in Chapter 4.3, the GDPR
385 Article 35 of the Gesetz zur Anpassung des Datenschutzrechts an die Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 und zur
Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/680.
386 Finck (n 13) 25.
387 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
388 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
389 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (n 146) 29.
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requires to take account of ‘all the means reasonably likely to be used’ to identify a natural
person considering all objective factors, inter alia, ‘the costs and amount of time required for
identification and technological developments’.391 State-of-art brute force attacks could not
derive user’s private key from the public key, but in a long-term, for instance, quantum
computers could break the SHA 256-bit keys used in Bitcoin or Ethereum.392 Considering the
implementation costs, amount of time required, and available technology it seems that a brute
force attack is beyond the means reasonably likely to be used to identify a natural person from
the public key at the moment. However, taking account of potential technological
developments, it is possible that quantum computers could break the public-key encryption in
a long-term.
Legal scholars have not been unanimous of the sufficient level of encryption. Eichler and others
have considered that due to the risk of future breaches, data should never be stored in encrypted
form to the blockchain.393 Article 29 Working Party has considered that the development of
technology should be considered for ‘the period for which the data will be processed’, which
seems to support the opinion of the Eichler and others because in traditional blockchains data
is often processed for an unlimited period of time. Limiting the time for how long data are
processed should be considered when developing traditional blockchain applications.  Ibáñez,
O’Hara and Simperl, on the other hand, have taken a more optimistic view by considering that
state-of-art encryption provides a sufficient level of encryption. However, blockchain
developers should follow technological advances, especially the development of quantum
computers, in light of the risk of re-identification.394 They consider that the destruction of the
private key and original data could be interpreted to constitute erasure since the encrypted data
is made unintelligible for anyone.395 In other words, the encrypted data is rendered anonymous
because it cannot identify a natural person by means reasonably likely to be used, and therefore
the right to erase does no longer apply to such data.
391 Recital 26 of the GDPR.
392 As a good illustration of state-of-art brute force attacks against public keys it has been noted that, ‘brute-force
attacks against 256-bit keys will be infeasible until computers are built from something other than matter and
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Here, an important question is who could enforce the right to erasure by destroying the private
key. In an ideal situation, the users would create their own private keys and enforce the right to
erasure by themselves. However, a common practice is that users rely on centralised or
decentralised wallets for their key management. Centralised wallets do not provide users with
full access to their private keys. Thus, these users should request the centralised wallets to erase
their private keys. Decentralised wallets instead allow users to have full control over their
private keys, and thus the users could enforce the right to erasure by themselves by destroying
the private key.396 This solution seems to put the onus on data subjects who could independently
enforce the right to erasure by destroying the private key or possibly just by retaining the control
over the private key.
Another alternative interpretation of the erasure relies on hashing-out and deleting the off-
chain data. As mentioned in Chapter 4.3, blockchains could be used as ‘decentralised
verification machines’, which store only hashes of the personal data.397 The main idea of
hashing-out is that instead of storing data directly on the blockchain, data could be stored on
external off-chain storage while only hashes of the data would be stored on-chain. Hashing-out
simplifies matters with regard to data protection significantly because data could be stored on
a modifiable off-chain database under the control of a responsible data controller. Many legal
scholars recognise the potential of hashing-out as a possible solution for traditional
blockchains.398 Finck has regarded it even as ‘the most important step developers must take to
ensure GDPR compliance’.399
Hashing-out enables that data could be modified and even erased from the off-chain storage
without compromising the validity of blockchain because the hashes would still exist on-chain.
Hashing-out would greatly help to exercise the right to erasure since the transactional data
stored off-chain could be erased by data subject’s request.400  Nevertheless, a hash of the
transactional data, which may constitute personal data, remains on-chain and the problem
regarding the right to erasure may exist. Eichler and others have considered that when off-chain
396 Tasos Kakouris, ‘Decentralized Wallets : A Need & a Hurdle’ (Medium, 11 June 2018)
<https://medium.com/@tasoskakouris/decentralized-wallets-a-need-a-hurdle-486d3c57b1a9> accessed 17
September 2018.
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399 Finck (n 13) 12.
400 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
74
data is erased, and the original off-chain data cannot be easily retrieved from the hash, there
would not necessarily be a conflict with the right to erasure. The original data would be erased,
and the on-chain hash could be considered anonymous because identification on the basis of
the hash could be considered as means which are beyond what is reasonably likely to be used
to identify an individual.401
However, hashing-out often requires re-introduction of a trusted third party, which is in a total
contradiction with the purpose of traditional blockchains to eliminate the need for trusted
middle-men.402 Betrayal of the decentralisation principle is not necessarily an unavoidable
problem. Eberhardt and Tai have presented on their research different patterns for moving
computation and data off-chain while preserving one of the main features of traditional
blockchains – the trustlessness.403 Although the purpose of their research was primarily to
examine the current state of the off-chain solutions in order to resolve functionality and storage
cost issues relating to on-chain operations, these patterns are also potential from the data
protection perspective.404 The most potential pattern for reconciling the conflict between the
right to erasure and immutability seems to be the content addressable storage. It could allow
storing only hashes of the data on-chain without relying on a centralised intermediary for storing
the off-chain data.405 However, instead of relying on centralised intermediaries, the pattern
relies on distributed peer-to-peer off-chain storages, such as InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)
or Swarm, which are permanent or immutable in the sense that a user cannot force other nodes
hosting the off-chain data to erase it.406 Therefore, the conflict between immutability and the
right to erasure seems to remain in a truly decentralised version of the hashing-out.
Another interesting alternative interpretation of the term erasure, which could provide a solution
for the conflict between immutability and the right to erasure, concerns access authorisation
systems. As mentioned in Chapter 4.2, it has been widely recognised that blockchain
401 Eichler and others (n 190) 8.
402 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 8.
403 These off-chaining patterns include challenge response, off-chain signatures, content-addressable storage,
delegated computation, and low contract footprint patterns. Jacob Eberhardt and Stefan Tai, ‘On or off the
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Johnsen (eds), Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing - 2017 (Springer, 2017) 3.
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technology could be used to develop advanced access authorisation systems that allow
individuals to have true control over their personal data. These solutions could be built on top
of blockchain applications so that only the users manage and control their data.407 The users
could decide who can access the data and keep track of data controllers or processors accessing
and using the data. Moreover, these solutions could provide data controllers with a convenient
way to prove that their processing is based on the data subject’s consent.408
The data subject could exercise the right to erasure by disabling access to the data from any
party the data subject has previously given access to the data. The data is not erased from the
storage but rather the access to the data is disabled from other parties. Salmensuu has argued
that it is conceivable that regulators would accept disabling access to the data as an alternative
solution for outright deletion considering the potential of these solutions to provide individuals
with the true control over their personal data.409 However, withdrawing consent would only
make the data inaccessible from that moment on while all old data would stay recorded, which
speaks against disabling access as an alternative solution for an outright deletion.410
Regarding transactional data stored and processed on traditional blockchains, above described
alternative interpretations of the erasure could provide solutions for reconciling the conflict
between immutability of traditional blockchains and the right to erasure. Nevertheless, these
solutions cannot provide a solution for erasing public keys, which are an essential feature of
any traditional blockchain application. The public key and the transaction history would still be
available on the ledger. As discussed in Chapter 4.3, public keys constitute personal data under
the GDPR in many cases. Thus, the conflict between the right to erasure and immutability of
traditional blockchains persists. The public keys are much more problematic regarding the right
to erasure because they cannot be erased or stored off-chain as the public keys are crucial for
validating transactions on blockchains.411 Here, the question of anonymisation arises again.
Anonymisation of public keys would be the most effective solution for complying with the right
to erasure in traditional blockchains. Data subjects should not rely on third parties for their key
management in order to avoid situations similar to the Breyer case. Further, developers have
407 Salmensuu (n 172) 23.
408 Neisse, Steri and Nai-Fovino (n 133) 1.
409 Salmensuu (n 172) 115.
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already found ways to validate transactions on blockchains without concealing the public keys
or the content of the transactions to the validators.412 While these solutions may not be ready
for widespread implementation, the rapid development of technology could provide solutions
in the future.
5.3 Taking a review of the current state of play and a look into the future
5.3.1 Assessing the current situation of the conflict
Previous Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 examined the content of the right to erasure, established that
there is a conflict between Article 17 and immutable blockchains, and analysed different
solutions proposed for reconciling the conflict. In light of the above, it is time to assess the
current state of play. The conflict between the right to erasure and the immutability of traditional
blockchains has been well recognised in both legal and blockchain communities. However, very
few commentators have gone further to research how to resolve the various issues between
blockchain technology and data protection.413 At the moment many blockchain projects, which
are specifically designed to process personal data or allow processing of any type of data risk
violating Article 17 of the GDPR because there is no clear and convenient way to erase personal
data by a request. A closer look into the different solutions proposed to reconcile the conflict
between the immutability of traditional blockchains and the right to erasure, however, reveals
that the conflict may not be as insurmountable as it prima facie seems.
Firstly, the right to erasure is not an absolute right, but instead, the data subject must have a
legal ground for his or her request. Some legal scholars have proposed flexible interpretations
of the legal grounds. The flexible interpretations could allow taking account of the specific
features of blockchain technology and turning down the data subject’s request in certain
circumstances.414 For instance, the core functioning principle of technology could be regarded
412 For example, zero-knowledge proofs have been considered as potential for concealing the public keys and
transaction amounts. More on the technological solutions discussed for anonymising data on blockchains see
Chapter 4.3.3 Table of different technological solutions providing more privacy for individuals making
transactions in blockchain network.
413 Christopher Kuner and others, ‘Blockchain versus Data Protection’ (2018) 8 International Data Privacy Law
103, 104.
414 Berberich and Steiner (n 48) 426; Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 4.
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as an ‘other legal ground’ under the Article 17(1)(b), or personal data could be considered
necessary for the processing due to the immutability of blockchains.415 The legal grounds for
the right to erasure are closely connected to the lawful bases for the processing under Article 6
of the GDPR. Blockchain developers should carefully assess the lawful basis for the processing
already in the design phase. Choosing consent or legitimate interest of third parties as the lawful
basis for the processing could provide a way to refuse accommodating data subject’s request of
erasure. It remains to be seen whether any of these arguments could hold in courts.
In addition to purely legal solutions, the technological community has presented an interesting
solution that could help to comply with the right to erasure on traditional blockchains.
Blockchain developers have presented a concept of redactable blockchains, which enable to
modify or erase data on old blocks in a convenient way without invalidating the blockchain and
causing a considerable computational overhead.416 While implementing chameleon-hashes to
traditional blockchains seems an attractive option from a data protection perspective, further
research on how chameleon-hashes could be used in practice to comply with the right to erasure
seems necessary.
The third possible solution for the conflict relies on the interpretation of the term ‘erasure’.
Legal scholars have noted that the erasure is not defined in the GDPR, which could provide
room for alternative interpretations to outright deletion.417 There are different interpretations of
the erasure for different use case scenarios of traditional blockchains. When traditional
blockchains are used as decentralised verification machines (only hashes of the personal data
are stored on-chain), it is conceivable that making data unintelligible for anyone by destroying
the off-chain data and possible salt could constitute erasure under Article 17. Similarly, when
processing of personal data is carried out by smart contracts, destroying the encryption key and
original data could be regarded as an alternative implementation of the erasure.418 Third
alternative implementation could be available when access authentication systems are built on
top of traditional blockchain applications. The data subject could exercise control over his or
her personal data and independently enforce the right to erasure by disabling access to the
415 Berberich and Steiner (n 48) 426.
416 Ateniese and others (n 333).
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data.419 These alternative interpretations of the erasure are particularly interesting because they
enable to respond to data subjects’ requests in traditional blockchains without compromising
immutability. Therefore, if flexible interpretations of the erasure would be accepted, both data
protection and blockchain communities could be satisfied.
While the above-described solutions could help to comply with the right to erasure with respect
to transactional data, in many cases, the problem exists in relation to the public keys. The
transactional data stored on blockchains is often linked to a particular public key, which must
be publicly available to enable validators to verify transactions. When relying on alternative
interpretations of the erasure, only a transactional data stored inside the block is made
unintelligible. Public keys would still be visible on the blockchain.420 The most obvious solution
for the issue of erasing public keys would be the anonymisation of public keys.421 The question
remains open whether public keys could be anonymised data with advanced anonymisation
techniques.422 The question of public keys and anonymisation should be carefully considered
when developing new blockchain applications because compliance with the right to erasure
could be even more problematic with public keys than transactional data.
Blockchain applications that allow processing any type of data or which are specifically
designed to process personal data currently run the risk of infringing Article 17, although the
different solutions analysed above could help to comply with the right to erasure. Traditional
blockchains applications could face heavy sanctions set out in Article 83 of the GDPR.
Infringement of Article 17 is one of the infringements that could trigger the most aggravated
administrative fines of the regulation, ‘administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or in the
case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding
financial year, whichever is higher’.423 Even though the question concerning allocation of
responsibilities on blockchains, and thus who could face the administrative fines remains open,
these heavy sanctions combined with the legal uncertainty in relation to the conflict between
the right to erasure and traditional blockchains may deter investors and blockchain developers
from designing new blockchain applications and possibly individuals from using those
419 Salmensuu (n 172) 114.
420 Finck (n 13) 14.
421 Finck (n 13) 16.
422 Finck (n 13) 16.
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applications. Therefore, there is a need for guidance that could provide answers to these
questions and legal certainty for all the stakeholders.
5.3.2 Building a bridge between the GDPR and blockchain technology
There are many uncertainties and open questions that require further research. In order to
reconcile the conflict between the immutability of traditional blockchains and the right to
erasure under Article 17 of the GDPR, it is important to identify the relevant questions that
should be addressed. From a legal perspective, the first and most essential question concerns
the anonymisation. What would be a sufficient level of encryption or hashing that could render
data anonymous under the GDPR? Anonymisation could provide a solution especially to issues
arising from the transparency of metadata (public keys). Many legal scholars have argued that
the high threshold for anonymisation set out by Article 29 Working Party should be revised.424
Anonymisation would the most obvious and efficient solution for the issues between the
regulation and blockchain technology. While advanced anonymisation techniques may offer
extremely high level of privacy for individuals, the development of quantum computers could
threaten these solutions in the future.425 Considering that often data is stored on blockchains for
an unlimited period, any possibility to break the encryption in the future should be taken
seriously, especially when personal data is concerned. Therefore, attention should be paid also
to how long the data is to be processed on blockchains.
Another essential question concerns the allocation of responsibilities in traditional blockchains.
Who should be responsible for the processing of personal data on blockchains? Considering
nodes and miners as data controllers or joint controllers would lead to enforcement difficulties
because they could not respond to the tasks of data controllers under the GDPR.426 However,
the chameleon-hashes could provide a way to comply with the right to erasure in such
decentralised peer-to-peer networks by relying on secret sharing schemes, where certain chosen
parties are responsible for redacting blockchain.427 Some have argued that when blockchain is
used for direct interaction between individuals, it is not possible to find a responsible data
controller at all. Nodes and miners should instead be considered as infrastructure, and the
424 El Emam and Álvarez (n 173) 76; Stalla-Bourdillon and Knight (n 175) 307.
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responsibility over the personal data should be shifted to the data subjects.428 Shifting
responsibility over the personal data to data subjects would require educating the data subjects
of the risks related to processing of personal data on blockchain applications. When personal
data are processed in smart contract platforms, responsibility could be allocated to the owners
of the blockchain application, which relies on traditional blockchain as a backend. In such a
scenario, nodes and miners could be considered as data processors, which would, in turn, result
in the obligation to conclude data processing agreements with all the nodes and miners of the
blockchain network. This obligation would be difficult to enforce in practice, which has been
regarded by some scholars as a sign that nodes and miners should be considered as
infrastructure in all scenarios.429
As regards to allocation of responsibilities in light of enforcing the right to erasure, it seems
that considering nodes and miners as separate data controllers or joint controllers would not be
recommendable because they cannot independently erase data by a request. Achieving a
majority of the nodes to agree with the erasure would not be a practical solution due to a large
number of participants. The chameleon-hashes could enable a decentralised way to enforce the
right by giving the power to redact blockchain to a secret set of users. Further, if the owners of
blockchain application are considered as data controllers, the chameleon-hashes could be used
to empower them to erase data from the blockchain. The third option would be to consider users
as both data controllers and data subjects at the same time. The users could enforce the right to
erasure independently by relying on alternative means of erasure, for instance, by destroying
the private key and original data or by disabling access to the data. Allocation of responsibilities
is not an easy task on traditional blockchain networks but all the more important in respect to
compliance with the right to erasure.
The solutions proposed to reconcile the conflict between the right to erasure and the
immutability of traditional blockchains are based on flexible interpretations. It remains to be
seen whether courts and authorities could approve the flexible interpretations of the legal
grounds for erasure. Similarly, the legitimacy of the alternative means of erasure depends on
how the term erasure will be interpreted by courts and authorities. The third uncertain element
of Article 17 concerns the obligation to inform other controllers, the actual right to be
428 Eichler and others (n 190) 6; Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 10.
429 Eichler and others (n 190) 6.
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‘forgotten’ provision, and how courts will enforce it. Even though Article 17 provides rather
detailed and precise right to erasure, the actual scope of the right will be shaped by future
interpretations.
Some of the questions identified above require blockchain-specific responses. Guidance on the
matters could be delivered by data protection authorities, such as national DPAs, the EDPB,
and the EDPS. In addition, the Commission has established the EU Blockchain Observatory
and Forum, which is currently researching the issues between blockchain and the GDPR. Some
questions might require even more detailed and specific answers for which the GDPR offers
certain soft law instruments. Approved certification mechanisms under Article 42 could prove
to be a practical way of providing legal certainty for more specific questions.430 Approved codes
of conducts under Article 40 could, in turn, provide case-specific guidance on the industry
level.431
While guidance may be provided either by hard law or soft law instruments, it is likely that
some of the questions will be answered by courts of the Member States and the Court. Not all
questions require blockchain-specific answers, but instead, for instance, the questions about the
threshold of anonymisation or the interpretation of the ‘erasure’ may be answered within
another context than blockchain. The blockchain technology is not alone with the problems
regarding the GDPR. For instance, similar issues have arisen in relation to big data and machine
learning.432 In addition to keeping an eye on the different interpretations of the concepts and
terms of the GDPR, other conflicts between blockchain technology and the GDPR, especially
with respect to data protection principles, should be carefully followed. If processing of
personal data on a specific traditional blockchain application is in infringement with some of
the data protection principles, and therefore the processing is considered unlawful, data subject
will have a legal ground to request erasure regardless of the possible consent or legitimate
interest of third parties for the processing.
430 Wirth and Kolain (n 268).
431 De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 89) 192.
432 Tal Z Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 47(4) Seton Hall Law Review 995;
Eduard Fosch Villaronga, Peter Kieseberg and Tiffany Li, ‘Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial
Intelligence and the Right to Be Forgotten’ (2018) 34 Computer Law and Security Review 304.
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Identifying relevant legal questions and addressing them is essential for reconciling the conflict
between the right to erasure and the immutability of traditional blockchains. In addition to the
legal approach, the technology itself could provide solutions for the conflict in the future.
Further advances in the anonymisation techniques, the chameleon-hashes, or the blockchain-
based access authorisation systems could help to comply with the right to erasure and other data
subjects’ rights. The best way to achieve compliance with the GDPR is to consider data
protection issues already in the design phase of blockchain projects. The EDPS has emphasised
this view by recommending developers to build privacy-friendly blockchains which are in line
with the principle of data protection by design.433 So far, most of the technological attempts
have focused on providing more privacy to individuals using blockchain applications. While
improving privacy is certainly beneficial also for users’ data protection, more attention should
be explicitly paid to data protection compliance on traditional blockchains.434 On the other
hand, the rapid development of technology might bring new data protection issues, for instance,
quantum computers could break even high-level encryption. Blockchain developers should
follow these advancements in technology and prepare solutions also for the emerging issues.435
Considering that blockchain technology is widely recognised as an innovative and extremely
potential technology, the fact that blockchain technology could provide individuals with the
‘true control’ over their personal data and enable new alternative means to achieve the objects
of the GDPR436, and the fact that the GDPR was not drafted taking into account blockchain
technologies, there seems to be room for an flexible approach for the problems between the
regulation and blockchain technology. A simple solution for the problems would be to change
or reform the GDPR, which, however, is not likely to happen because changing the regulation
would be very lengthy and laborious process, and even after such reform, the regulation would
likely be outdated again.437 A general exception for blockchain technology seems just as
unlikely scenario as the reform because the GDPR expressly states that the data protection of
individuals should be technologically neutral.438 Most likely the GDPR will apply to blockchain
applications that process personal data, and hopefully, the GDPR will be interpreted in a flexible
manner taking into consideration specific properties of the technology. It is important to notice
that the flexible interpretations require that blockchain projects are by design developed
433 European Data Protection Supervisor (n 280) 43.
434 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 7.
435 Ibáñez, O’Hara and Simperl (n 8) 12.
436 Finck (n 13) 29.
437 Villaronga, Kieseberg and Li (n 433) 312.
438 Recital 15 of the GDPR.
83
considering compliance with data protection obligations. This research has focused on building
a bridge between the GDPR and traditional blockchains by identifying legal questions,
especially in relation to the conflict between the right to erasure and the immutability of
traditional blockchain technology, which could be addressed with flexible interpretations that
enable compliance with the right to erasure. In order to enable peaceful coexistence of the
regulation and the blockchain technology in the future, it is recommendable that data protection
and technological experts cooperate to find solutions for designing privacy-friendly blockchain
applications that allow further development of traditional blockchains without causing an undue
impact on data subjects.439
6. Conclusions
It is a common phenomenon that regulation is one step behind innovations and advancing
technologies. The blockchain technology is a prime example of this phenomenon. Trying to
apply different data protection rights and obligations of the GDPR to the traditional blockchain
technology is not an easy task. Essentially, reconciling tensions between the regulation and the
technology is about finding a balance between the data protection of individuals and the
promotion of innovation. Even though the right to data protection is a fundamental right and
must be respected accordingly, it should not ride roughshod over the promotion of innovation.
Promotion of innovation is a normative objective of the EU. 440 Creation of the Innovation
Union as part of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth reflects
the importance of fostering research and innovation in the Union. Establishment of the EU
Blockchain Observatory and Forum is, in turn, a clear sign that the Commission has recognised
the potential of blockchain technology. Both interests are worth protecting. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine how to find a balance between law and technology – between the GDPR
and the traditional blockchain technology.
The focus of this research has been especially on the conflict between ‘immutable’ traditional
blockchains and the right to erasure under Article 17 of the GDPR.  Before going deeper into
the main issue, this research addressed two essential preliminary questions to give a proper
439 Finck (n 13) 29.
440 Finck (n 13) 29.
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understanding of the main issue. The question about anonymisation and personal data on
blockchains, on the one hand, determines whether the GDPR and its obligations apply to a
specific blockchain application at all. On the other hand, anonymisation of personal data could
be the most effective solution also for the conflict between the immutability and the right to
erasure. This research notes that not all blockchain applications process personal data, but many
traditional blockchain applications revolve around transactions between individuals.
Blockchain applications which allow storing any type of data to the blockchain and applications
which are specially developed to process personal data trigger in many cases the application of
the GDPR even though the applications rely on pseudonymisation and encryption to provide
more privacy for the individuals transacting. The threshold for anonymisation is currently very
high, but hopefully, the near zero-risk requirement is reconsidered soon.
The question about allocation of responsibilities on traditional blockchain networks is another
relevant question because it addresses who should be responsible for enforcing data subjects’
right to erasure and from whom the data subjects should request the erasure. Allocation of
responsibilities is an illustrative example of the difficulties applying the GDPR to the
blockchain technology. This research reviewed different possibilities to allocate responsibility
on traditional blockchains. In respect to enforcing the right to erasure on traditional blockchains,
two most suitable approaches are to develop further and implement chameleon-hashes or to
shift the responsibility for enforcing the right to data subjects, who could enforce the right
independently by relying on alternative means of erasure.
The first conclusion of this research concerns the current situation of the conflict between the
immutability and the right to erasure. Processing personal data on traditional blockchain
applications is currently likely to infringe the right to erasure under Article 17, even though
there are different solutions proposed for compliance. Alternative interpretations of the right to
erasure could provide a solution for erasing transactional data. However, in many cases the
problem exists in relation to public keys. If traditional blockchain application infringes Article
17, it could face heavy administrative fines. The legal uncertainty is a significant impediment
to the development and implementation of traditional blockchains at the moment.
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The second conclusion is about how to address the conflict in the future. This research balances
between the data protection of individuals and the promotion of innovation and argues that the
GDPR should not prevent the development of blockchain technology considering the widely
recognised potential of blockchain technology, the fact that the GDPR was not drafted taking
into account blockchain technology, and the fact that blockchains may also provide new ways
to give individuals more control over their data and to achieve objectives of the GDPR. As
discussed in the Introduction, this research relies on law and economics approach, and, in
particular, on normative economic analysis of law. According to so-called Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, there is a need for change if it is possible to increase ‘the total welfare of a society’
by creating enough benefits for some individuals while compensating the loss caused to other
individuals.441 This research argues that there is a need for change because, if traditional
blockchains are designed taking account of data protection obligations and principles, the loss
caused to individuals’ data protection could be so insignificant that the benefits of the
technology to individuals could compensate that loss. The change is not about anything drastic,
such as reforming the GDPR or enacting a new blockchain-specific law, but instead, when
blockchain applications are designed to be data protection and privacy-friendly, traditional
blockchains could comply with the GDPR if the provisions are interpreted in a flexible manner.
This research has identified relevant legal questions regarding the main conflict. These
questions should be addressed to provide legal certainty for all the stakeholders in the
blockchain ecosystem. This thesis ha alsos proposed how to reconcile the main conflict by
providing flexible interpretations that could enable traditional blockchain applications to
comply with the right to erasure.
It is worth emphasising that traditional blockchain applications are still immature and far from
being widely implemented, even though Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have reached a
large group of users. Most of the traditional blockchain projects are still in a trial or pilot
phase.442 The issues about data protection and privacy are not the only bottlenecks, but the
issues concerning, for instance, scalability and security are also hindering widespread
implementation of the technology. That does not mean that it is too early to research and discuss
the data protection issues concerning traditional blockchains. On the contrary, this is a perfect
time for this discussion because it is still possible to affect the development of the technology.
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The discussion should focus on both identifying and addressing the issues. At the heart of the
issues is the fact that the GDPR was not written considering the decentralised approach of
traditional blockchains. Thus, reconciling the issues requires a new and more flexible way of
thinking. To quote one of the most influential physicists of the 20th century, Albert Einstein,
‘(t)he significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at
when we created them.’
